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Underconsumption: A Rationalization for Trade Unionists

FREDERIC MEYERS
The University of Texas

Any social movement requires a rationalization—to justify its existence to itself, and to the society. American labor movements, being social movements, have felt this need, and have from time to time developed more or less sophisticated economic rationalizations. One thread that runs consistently through the economic thinking of American trade union leaders has been that of underconsumptionism. The existence of trade unions has been justified as a means toward the end of greater social performance through the effects on purchasing power of higher wages and shorter hours.

This paper will briefly trace this thread through the thinking of earlier trade unionists, emphasizing especially the utopian character of the thought of Ira Steward, to this author's mind one of the more neglected and more fascinating of the galaxy of highly individual trade union leaders of the post-Civil War period.

Economics as a discipline has served, among other functions, that of providing a formal rationalization for a particular set of social institutions. Among the virtues claimed for a society which adhered strictly to the classical or neo-classical "rules of the game," was that of a continuous "tendency" toward full employment, a tendency from which actuality would depart only as the rules of the game were not enforced, or as dynamic changes required adjustments which could not be made instantaneously. It was the failure of the real world to provide even this "tendency" upon which the labor movements seized to center their attack upon the economists' rationalization, and to build one of their own.

Too frequently the model of a classical utopia (perhaps not a very utopian utopia) has been mistaken, consciously or otherwise, for a description of a real world. It provided the ideological base for the famous slogan, "What Helps Business Helps You," gliding neatly over the issue of whether the kind of business pleading for assistance was the kind described in Adam Smith's utopia.

The labor movement, which was as much interested in changing the status of its members as was Ricardo that of stock brokers, or the NAM in preserving that of its controlling members, could not, of course, accept the model of a society which, however utopian for stock brokers, would "naturally" condemn laborers to the fetters of the iron law.

Accordingly, the labor movement has always had to develop a rationalization of its own, whose slogan could be: "What Helps Labor Helps You."

Wage earners, like the NAM mistaking the classical model for a description of a real rather than an imaginary world, were led to the gravest strictures upon the doctrine received in learned circles:

The whole system of political economy, from beginning to end, is an apology for tyranny, and the whole tribe of political economists are humbugs; they are such because they have humbugged the people, and at their head stands the prince of humbugs, John Stuart Mill. . .

Among the foremost of these apologists of tyranny stands Adam Smith, who, in the very teeth of the starving millions of Great Britain, wrote in defense of the existing system of distribution because it 'secured to every man the fruits of his own industry.'

The union attack upon the stock broker's rationalization was, in some sense, more subtle than the work of the stock broker himself. Recognizing that in the state of things appeal had to be made to the self-interest of the ruling class (at least as long as it ruled), trade unionists did not propose to condemn their rulers to the rigors of an iron law, at least for the nonce. They maintained at least a short run consistency as between philosophy and slogan. The implications of the doom of the "wages system" that they foresaw were less loudly spoken and further distant than was the starvation which the dismal scientists intended "naturally" to visit upon the generations untold descending from the original sinners in the British working class.

In mitigation of the everlasting poverty to which the ungovernable tendency of the poor to reproduce themselves in ever greater numbers was naturally to condemn them, our stock broker's utopia would at least provide a "tendency" toward everlasting jobs for all.

As early as Jackson's campaigns for President, however, it was obvious that the real twin (unfortunately not identical) of the economists' imaginary sibling provided no such thing. The omnipotent power of the private greed of the stock broker, or his cousin the banker, resulted only

¹From a speech by W. H. Sylvis, President of the Iron Molders' Union in the '60s. Quoted in Sylvis, J. C., *The Life, Speeches, Labors and Essays of William H. Sylvis, Late President of the Iron Moulders International Union; by his Brother*, Philadelphia, Claxton, Remsen and Heffelfinger, 1872, p. 374.

in periodic "financial convulsions" with masses starving without jobs instead of with them. *The Man*, a labor paper of the period observed:

Biddle's screws are turned in every direction; wages are curtailed under the plea of scarcity, but in reality to make the worker feel the pressure . . .

It is Banking that gives an unnatural impulse to business at one time, and at another throws large classes of workmen out of employ.²

King Nick's tactics backfired. Jackson was elected and the labor movement seized upon the evident unemployment to begin the structure of a rationalization that was to last as a propagandistic weapon. The curtailment of wages could lead even more rapidly than their increase to the abolition of the wages system; and King Nick could not say he was not forewarned. The Mechanic's Union of Trade Associations had told him as early as 1828 what the consequences might be:

No greater error exists in the world than the notion that society will be benefited by deprecating the value of human labour. Let this principle (as at this day in England) be carried toward its full extent, and it is in vain that scientific power shall pour forth its inexhaustible treasures of wealth upon the world. Its products will all be amassed to glut the over-flowing storehouses, and useless hoards of its insatiable monopolizers; while the mechanic and productive classes, who constitute the great mass of the population, and who have wielded the power and laboured in the production of this immense abundance, having no other resource for subsistence than what they derive from the miserable pittance which they are compelled by competition to receive in exchange for their inestimable labour, must first begin to pine, languish and suffer under its destructive and withering influence. But the evil stops not here. The middling classes next, venders of the products of human industry, will begin to experience its deleterious effects. The demand for their articles must necessarily cease from the forced inability of the people to consume; trade must in consequence languish, and losses and failures become the order of the day. At last the contagion will reach the capitalist, throned as he is, in the midst of his ill gotten abundance, and his capital, from the most evident and certain causes, will become useless, unemployed, and stagnant, himself the trembling victim of continual alarms from robberies, burnings, and murder, the unhappy and perhaps ill fated object of innumerable imprecations, insults and implacable hatred from the wronged, impoverished, and despairing multitude.³

Thus, almost coincident with the beginning of a labor movement in the United States appeared a statement of a rationalization which the labor movement was to use almost continuously to justify its social function.

The theory of underconsumptionism, however, was to take a variety of forms. One of the most original was that of the eight hour movement developed by Ira Steward of the Machinists' and Blacksmiths' Union in the 1860's and '70's. Though Steward is probably best known now for

²March 5, 1834, p. 47, col. 1; March 22, 1834, p. 106, col. 2

³From the "preamble of the Mechanics' Union of Trade Associations," *Mechanics' Free Press*, Oct. 25, 1828, p.1, Cols. 1-3. Quoted in Commons, J. R. and Associates, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, Cleveland, A. H. Clark, 1910, Vol. V, pp. 84-90.

a jingle composed by his wife,⁴ his ideas worked themselves deep into labor thinking. Steward's right hand man, George McNeill, wrote several of the early eight-hour planks of the American Federation of Labor; Gompers quoted Steward on occasion.⁵

While Steward, as will be shown, borrowed a great deal from the stock broker, he twisted his words almost beyond recognition, and added the characteristic labor slant toward demand and the problem of unemployment:

What is meant by the words Political Economy? To this question answers should depend upon who it is that asks. One may say to a bright dozen year old boy, Political Economy means every boy can have all the marbles, skates, kite-twine, sleds, rides, etc., necessary for a 'good time.' Or for little girls Political Economy means more new dresses, dolls, picture books, playgrounds and play rooms all to themselves.

Every child wants such things; and why they cannot have all they want, or all they ought to have, is one half of Political Economy.

The other half of Political Economy concerns those who make marbles and skates, or dolls, picture books, etc. for a living. More toys or playthings therefore serve two parties or purposes; the *makers* and *users* of toys. And in Political Economy both parties or purposes are equally important. Little girls without dolls are distressed. Unemployed doll makers are told to do something else for a living, and little girls are told to do without dolls.⁶

Basic to the Stewardian philosophy was the proposition, "On the one side of the laborer's dollar could be printed or stamped the word 'wages'; on the other side of this same dollar could be made to read the word 'demand.'"⁷ Employers were in a continuous dilemma; "Overwork begins with the natural interest of large employers in buying days-works as cheaply and as many hours in length as possible. But when whole nations of laborers are overworked, their 'demand' for wealth increases so much slower than their 'supplies' that all cannot have employment."⁸ "They overlook their own interest, for Capitalists remember us as *Producers* to be paid as little as possible; but not as *Consumers* to be paid enough to enable us to buy their commodities."⁹

Steward adds to this basic idea an interesting and modern one concerning personal pecuniary saving:

"Whether you work by the piece, or work by the day, Decreasing the hours increases the pay."¹⁰

⁴See, for example, his report to the 1890 Convention, *Proceedings of the American Federation of Labor*, 1890, p. 13.

⁵Steward, Ira, "Political Economy," unpublished essay in the Wisconsin Historical Library.

⁶Steward, Ira, "Supply and Demand and Wages," unpublished essay in the Wisconsin Historical Library.

⁷Steward, Ira, "The Political Economy of Eight Hours," unpublished essay in the Wisconsin Historical Library.

⁸Steward, Ira, "Meaning of the Eight-Hour Movement," unpublished essay in the Wisconsin Historical Library.

Those who teach the laboring classes to economise, assume that what is true of a few individuals must be true of the whole world.

This is a most fatal mistake. The economy and self denial so absolutely necessary for individuals or small communities, is not necessary for all mankind. If everybody had always economized as much as possible in consuming wealth, there could have been no progress. And all mankind would have remained savages. Wealth cannot be consumed moderately or sparingly by the masses, and be produced rapidly. The more they consume, the more wealth will be produced for everybody. This is not true of individuals, but it is true of mankind as a whole. If a few people consume less, *they may have more wealth*; but the less wealth the world at large consumes, the less it will be able to produce, and the less it will have.¹⁰

The way out of unemployment and distressed "little girls without dolls" was through continuously higher wages.

But by 1870, the propagandists for the "iron law" had succeeded in convincing a good many people. Steward recognized the basic character of stock broker economics:

The ruling classes have always defended the idea of incessant toil and poverty for the masses and exceptional abundance and ease for themselves. There are probably no colleges in all Christendom, or professors of political economy that teach differently.¹¹

The capitalist classes have the idea that the laborer's prosperity is somehow *included* in their prosperity. But this is as unsatisfactory to the laborer as it would be to a lamb, to be 'included' in a lion!

The capitalist classes have two different theories concerning incomes. One theory for their own, and another for the income or wages of the laborer. They will prove, to their satisfaction, that if their income or capital is increased, the laborer is prospered accordingly. They will also prove, as conclusively, that larger incomes or higher wages for laborers, will merely increase the cost of production:—that every cent added to the laborer's wages, adds just so much cost to what he produces; and that the laborer himself, as a consumer, would pay out all that had been added to his wages.

This theory serves the wage *paying* class, better than the wage *receiving* class. Those who *pay* wages are blinded by their most immediate interest, which is to pay the lowest possible wages. And their wages fund is so much nearer their eyes than anything else, that it hides from their view the Alps on Alps of wealth beyond in the fact of machinery, that springs into being and increases in productiveness as wages advance.¹²

Steward, however, was willing to borrow from the economics of the capitalist class, twisting his borrowings, however, so that the "iron law" became a beneficent one. Workers were ever condemned to wages permitting only subsistence. It therefore follows that subsistence must be increased. Steward, realizing that the Devil finds work for idle hands, remembered that however dark, Lucifer had been an angel. The "work

¹⁰Steward, Ira, "Economy and Extravagance" unpublished manuscript in the Wisconsin Historical Library.

¹¹Steward, Ira, "Borrowed Capital," unpublished essay in the Wisconsin Historical Library.

¹²Steward, Ira, "Wages and Wealth," unpublished essay in the Wisconsin Historical Library.

for idle hands" is not work, but consumption. This consumption, once permitted to become habitual, becomes "subsistence." The way to make it habitual is to decrease hours, giving Lucifer his chance.

Increased leisure, therefore, increases subsistence, increases wages and purchasing power. But more than that, it encourages invention and the use of machinery through both higher labor costs and more purchasing power.

While adopting the Puritan reasoning that men in their idle hours must find ways of consuming, Steward attacked the moral conclusions:

But certain expenditures are called extravagant, and the charge of extravagance is made to sustain the claim that wages ought not to be higher. While the fundamental fact is forgotten that if wages ought not to be higher because men ought not to be indulged in more wealth, that the defense originally made for inventions, and chartered manufactories, has gone, and the abolition of patent laws, and corporations, must follow as a logical result.¹⁹

Like the Puritans, the trouble with the economists was that they had hold of the wrong natural law:

When tailors decide to live in better houses, and masons and carpenters decide to dress better;—when railroad and steamboat laborers conclude to have libraries, and book makers to go abroad, those who live in palaces, dress in silk and broad-cloth, take the most journeys and own the best libraries, charge them with outrageous extravagance.

Vastly more of these things can be produced by the laboring classes, because they will be assisted by natural forces. And the idea of disputing their right to avail themselves of such assistance, may be compared to the superstition that once prevailed against applying lightning rods to houses. Ignorant people regarded them as impious and daring attempts to interfere with the designs of God. They might as well have called a man a sinner, for taking the longest end of the lever.

In the demand and supply theory of wage prices, the idea most urged, is, that whether they rise or fall, it is in perfect harmony with natural causes. Are natural causes to be admired and worshipped, when wages are reduced, and their results denounced and branded as extravagance when they increase the luxuries and refinements of the masses? If it is true that natural forces will increase their luxuries, this fact proves they ought to be increased. And if they ought to be increased the charge of extravagance is gross impertinence.²⁰

Shortened hours, then, turn the iron law into a beneficent one, as well as solving the problem of underconsumption. Shorter hours means higher wages and greater consumption through increased levels of subsistence. When wages are increased, the utilization of machinery is encouraged—"the Alps on Alps of wealth"—by the "power of the cheaper over the dearer," encouraging manufacturers to substitute more for less efficient ways of doing things in terms of utilization of human energy. This in

¹⁹Steward, Ira, unpublished fragment on "Extravagance" in the Wisconsin Historical Library.

²⁰Steward, Ira, "Theory of Wages," unpublished essay in the Wisconsin Historical Library.

turn makes necessary and desirable further decreases in hours and increases in wages. By Steward and his followers the eight-hour movement was turned into a means toward a completely utopian society:

That Wealth may be more equally distributed, as well as more rapidly produced, Poverty abolished, Human Life lengthened, getting a living made easy, and Co-operative labor become the general rule in the production of wealth; that profits upon labor and interest on money may finally cease to exist; together with Idleness, Speculation, Class Legislation, Financial Convulsions, Intemperance, Prostitution, and War, through the gradual operation of the natural and moral causes which more leisure for the mass of laborers is sure to set in motion, are among the more prominent considerations in the argument for the Eight Hour System.¹⁸

In Steward's time, his particular brand of utopia came into conflict with another of great influence—a scheme of monetary reform first developed in the late 'forties and early 'fifties by Edward Kellogg, a business man who had suffered severely in the depression of the 'forties. His scheme was later seized upon by even such level headed unionists as W. H. Sylvis, together with a great many other union leaders of the War and immediate post-War period. Their strong feeling was best expressed by Sylvis when he said, "We must show them that when a just monetary system has been established there will no longer exist a necessity for Trades Unions."¹⁹

Kellogg's ideology was based only distantly on ideas about underconsumption. Dividing all distributive shares into wages and interest, he argued that with the then existing monetary system, the rate of interest tended to exceed the average national rate of increase in wealth. That being the case, necessarily from year to year interest takers not only appropriated the whole of the annual increase in wealth, but a part of that previously owned by wage earners, until ultimately wage earners became completely bankrupted. The policy answer was a government lending agency that would maintain rates of interest below the annual rate of increase in wealth, utilizing a flexible paper currency and a system of "interconvertible bonds" as the means toward that end.

While the Kelloggian and other schemes of monetary reform captured the imaginations of many unionists, and bitter battles were waged between the short-hour advocates and the monetary reformers, ultimately the utopian character of monetary reforms lost their grip, while underconsumptionism remained a keystone of labor rationalizations.

The reformist thinking of most of the important leaders of the Knights of Labor developed largely along lines of monetary reform and cooperative enterprise. Causes for unemployment were found largely in the

¹⁸Preamble to the Constitution of the Boston Eight Hour League, published in the "American Workman," (Boston) Sept. 25, 1869.

¹⁹Quotation on the title page of Sylvis, J. C., *The Life, Speeches, Labors and Essays of William H. Sylvis*, op. cit.

monetary system through its effect on price levels. Only very occasional expressions of the thread of underconsumptionism are to be found in their thought.

Certain national unions of the period, however, were unconvinced of the merits of either of the leading utopias—the eight-hour movement or "interconvertible bonds" or free silver. Underconsumptionism, was, however, consistent with the strictest of business unionism. It provided a rationalization for wage increases. Thus, the Columbia Typographical Union in 1875 answered an employer proposal for a wage decrease in the following words:

Reduction of wages is important to property owners and business men in all communities, and should command attention. It lessens incomes and expenditures. Workingmen are consumers, generally, to the extent of their income. If, by reduction they lose twenty percent, by that much will their capacity to buy be affected.¹⁷

With the death of Sylvis in 1869, the Molders' Union also came under the leadership of a group of business unionists, who did not disdain a useful rationalization. President Saffin argued that underconsumption was a serious aggravating factor in depressions. During prosperity the rich became richer and the poor remained poor. Finally a failure in demand occurred as purchasing power accumulated in the hands of the few, who did not exercise it because their necessities did not require it. This failure in demand was aggravated as workers lost employment.¹⁸

The later "realistic" leaders of the A.F. of L. saw the usefulness of the underconsumptionist argument and applied it from time to time, for thirty years before the widely heralded "new wage policy." President Gompers in his report of 1893 argued that depressions were caused by technological improvement unaccompanied by increases in the ability of the people to consume.¹⁹ In 1896 he said: "Industrial crises and stagnation results from many causes, but particularly from the lack of opportunity of the workers to consume more largely of the product of their labor. A reduction in wages means a lesser consumption of these products, thus rendering the labor of other workers unnecessary, and throwing them out of employment. The crisis becomes intensified and prolonged."²⁰ It lasts until "dead capital" becomes "worn out and useless and has to be replaced by new, thus gradually reemploying labor."²¹ This prolongation could be curtailed by increasing wages, shortening hours, and generally stimulating worker purchasing power.

¹⁷*Action of the Columbia Typographical Union 101 on the Report of the Committee of Thirteen on the Memorial of a Portion of the Employing Printers of Washington to Reduce Prices*, Washington, Tribune Print, 1875, p. 12.

¹⁸See: *Proceedings of the Thirteenth Session of the Iron Molders' Union of North America*, Cleveland, July 5, 1876, p. 5.

¹⁹*Proceedings of the American Federation of Labor*, 1893, p. 11.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 1896, p. 18.

²¹*Ibid.*

This notion remained a part of A.F. of L. thinking throughout, although it was not until the 1920's that its great propagandistic value was fully realized, and the "new wage policy" enunciated. It has remained a primary device of major labor groups to consolidate their own ranks, to appeal for public support, and for use with employers and before governmental agencies to support demands for higher wages and shorter hours. It is a notion which underlies much of the philosophy of important leaders of the CIO.

It has been only recently, however, that the significance of aggregate demand has been accepted among orthodox economists, so that the strength of the union argument could be reinforced by appeals to authority, and a Robert Nathan could argue for the United Steelworkers of America, CIO, before the Steel Board for a wage increase based upon even "an unorthodox version of Keynesian economics."

Whether this infiltration of popular thought into the profession represents a discovery of the final truth about our society, or merely a reflection of changing economic power to rationalize a new and rising ruling class we leave to other forums.

The Public Interest in the Use of Rural Land

T. J. CAULEY
Indiana University

The war has been over almost five years; the post-war inflation has passed its peak; housing is still short; food prices are falling; much of Europe and Asia are still hungry. In view of this somewhat mixed pattern, is it not time for a critical review of our public policy toward the use of rural land in this country? That is, we may ask ourselves what it is that we want from rural land. What can it be made to contribute to the satisfactory functioning of our economic system as a whole? In short, to what extent and in what ways is the use of rural land "affected with a public interest" and how may this public interest be protected down through the years?

Such an enquiry probably necessitates some definition of terms. How is a "public interest" related to the "public welfare"? Tentatively, at least, we may say that the public welfare consists of a balance and an integration of public interests. The fact that there must be *balance* and *integration* of public interests in order to promote the public welfare indicates the possibility of conflict between the pursuit of one public interest and that of another; and this is definitely the case with respect to some of the public interests in the use of rural land. In fact, the presence of such conflicts has been responsible for much of the most serious abuse which rural land has suffered, and this threatens to continue to be the case.

We may well begin with a summary statement in outline form of the more important public interests in the use of rural land and then proceed to a more detailed consideration of each of them and of the problems to which they give rise.

Public Interests In The Use of Rural Land

A. Physical productivity and the maintenance of physical assets.

1. The *continuing* production of adequate quantities of food, fiber, and other raw materials, both for ourselves and for sizeable exports to Western Europe and possibly to other parts of the world.
2. Protection against the flooding and silting of waterways.
3. Preservation of desirable forms of wildlife and the beauties of the rural landscape.

B. The effective functioning of the exchange feature of our economic system; *i.e.*, the maintenance of sufficient purchasing power on the part of rural people to enable them:

1. To buy a proportionate share of urban goods and services.
2. To pay a fair share of the costs of governmental and other public services.
3. To acquire and maintain the ownership of the bulk of rural property.

C. Providing a "good life"—as distinct from or in addition to material values and money—for rural people and, in so far as possible, for all our people.¹

Obviously all of these interests are affected by numerous factors besides that of the use of rural land; but to the extent that they are affected by the use of rural land, we are concerned with them in this discussion. A brief analysis of each of them may be worthwhile.

It is elementary that the vast bulk of our food comes from rural land, and just now nothing is more critically important to the public welfare than food. There is a world-wide shortage of it which may well continue for several years. Even in so-called normal times, there is a shortage of food if the proper nourishment of all the submerged millions of people in the world is taken as the standard. There has never been a surplus of food in the world as a whole—perhaps not even in such a relatively well fed country as the United States of America—if adequate dietary standards for all the people are assumed. So-called surpluses which have existed at times in the past have resulted mainly from lack of adequate purchasing power on the part of potential consumers.

There has been considerable promise of synthetic foods, but the very meager achievements in the production of such to date would indicate that we must get by far the larger part of our food from rural land for a long time to come. The growing of food plants in factory-like vats of chemicals has also been done experimentally, but the process has not achieved a significant success as yet. There is also some question as to whether foods grown in this manner have the same qualities as those grown in the soil. The soil is an almost infinitely complex mixture of plant food, bacteria, and inert matter which we have not as yet been able to duplicate by artificial methods in its entirety, and we do not know yet just which of the numerous constituents of the soil are essential to the growth of food of maximum nutritive value.

¹Cf. "Most people agree that our land policies should be such as to guide us toward use of land in ways that will provide the highest possible standard of living for the people of the United States. Under such a concept our land policies should contribute toward security for the farm home, stable and adequate incomes for farm families, and a continuous and abundant supply of farm products for all of our people. Most agree, further, that we should use our lands only in ways that will maintain their productivity. To do otherwise is to cheat ourselves and our children, and to defeat our aims." *Planning For a Permanent Agriculture*, Miscellaneous Publication 351, U.S.D.A., p. 19.

Most of the raw materials from which our clothing is made come from rural land—cotton, wool, linen, silk and leather, being the most important. Synthetic fabrics have been developed intensively in recent years, but they still have a very long way to go before there is any real possibility of their replacing the products of rural land. And it should be noted, of course, that some of the raw materials from which the synthetic fabrics are made are themselves products of rural land.

There need be no effort here to list all of the raw materials for industry which come from rural land. Lumber, wood pulp, tannic acid, naval stores, and vegetable oils may serve to illustrate. There are dozens of others of greater or lesser importance.

The use of rural land greatly affects the flow of our rivers and smaller waterways. Floods have been numerous and highly destructive of life and property in recent years. Between floods, some of the rivers have degenerated into mere trickles clogged with inadequately oxidated sewage and other wastes. Once shimmering lakes have become miserable mud-flats. Reservoirs for water supply and for power have silted up to the point that their usefulness is lost. To some extent flooding and silting of waterways are phenomena which cannot be controlled; but to a larger extent, they are the result of certain abuses of rural land, such as complete deforestation of water sheds and erosion-inducing practices on crop-land. There is, of course, a strong public interest in the reduction of floods and silting; and much can be done in this direction through a wise use of rural land.

Such forms of wildlife as game-birds and animals, song-birds, fur-bearing animals and fish are sources of much pleasure and satisfaction to many people not to mention their considerable commercial value; and thus their preservation is in the public interest. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the preservation of desirable forms of wildlife is primarily a matter of the balanced use of rural land. Birds and animals and fish will survive and multiply when they are provided with adequate food and cover. Without these, no system of closed seasons and other forms of protection from the hunter's gun and the fisherman's hook will succeed in making game and fish plentiful. And food and cover for wildlife are primarily by-products of the properly balanced use of rural land.

Closely related to wildlife are the esthetic qualities of rural scenery—green forests, clear-running streams, unspoiled hill-sides, ungrazed fields in the autumn sun. These things are the sources of great human satisfactions for which there appear to be no substitutes. Unwise use of rural land can ruin them all, and in many parts of our country has already done so. There is an important public interest in preserving as much

of the beauty of the rural landscape as is consistent with the protection of the other interests.

Let us shift now to a consideration of the public interest in the maintenance of adequate purchasing power on the part of rural people. Why is it important to the nation as a whole that rural people be able, one year with another, to buy and pay for a proportionate share of the goods and services which are produced in our towns and cities? The answer to this is obvious from the very nature of our economic system. Many of our industries depend upon farmers and other users of rural land for a market for their products. The manufacturers of farm implements, trucks, automobiles, work-clothes, fertilizers, building materials, and fencing are illustrative examples. Railroads carry farm products to market and bring manufactured goods back. Wholesalers and retailers in many localities are primarily dependent upon farm customers. Country doctors and certain other professional men serve farm people in large part. The big mail order concerns depend on rural people for a major portion of their sales. Obviously if rural people lose their purchasing power, all of these industries, businesses, and professions suffer. And their distress, in turn, affects the pecuniary welfare of many other groups. Our economic system consists of a great number of inter-related units; and, an upset in any one of them spreads in its effect more or less to all the others. Farmers and other users of rural land constitute roughly one-fifth of our total population, and thus their ability or inability to purchase a proportionate share of the goods and services produced by the other people has a profound effect throughout the whole of the economic system. In so far as the use of rural land affects the purchasing power of rural people, it is a very important public interest.

As a result of the war, the purchasing power of rural people is relatively high just now; but there is good reason to believe that it will suffer severe curtailment within the next few years. And, when this curtailment comes, it may be the fore-runner of serious depression in industry and trade at large. Undoubtedly the relative lack of purchasing power on the part of farm people was one of the principal causes of the crash in 1929 and the long period of depression which followed.

Closely related to this matter is the inability of rural people to pay their fair share of the taxes and other costs of public services. When purchasing power fails, ability to pay taxes fails also. If taxes are not paid by rural people, either these people must go without adequate governmental services or such services must be paid for by somebody else. More frequently in recent decades it has been the latter. In many impoverished rural communities in the 1920's and 1930's, the public schools and the public roads and the public health services were paid for by people living elsewhere.

As a general proposition, it is desirable that the people of a community pay for their own local governmental services.

And in the same connection, it appears desirable also that the bulk of the property in a rural community belong to the people living there. The ownership of property is simply another aspect of purchasing power. To acquire property and to hold on to it necessitate purchasing power. Shortage of purchasing power on the part of rural people has lead to the present condition in which the majority of rural land and other property is either owned or encumbered by corporations and people in the towns and cities. A whole train of economic and social evils has resulted from this state of affairs. The last few years of relative prosperity for the farmers have relieved the situation to some extent, but there are still many rural communities in which hardly any of the property belongs to the people who live there. The evils of absentee landlordism are too notorious to require detailed discussion here.

Finally it is in the public interest that rural land be used in such a way that it contribute as much as possible to the creation of a "good life" for rural people and others affected by rural land uses. By a "good life" in this sense is meant a life with as many of the basic satisfactions of human nature as possible. This is, of course, an almost infinitely complex subject and is obviously affected by many factors besides the use of rural land. But if we assume for the time being, with certain of the sociologists, that the fundamental wants of human beings are for new experience, security, recognition, and response, then it follows that some ways of utilizing rural land are more conducive to these ends than others. Certainly the life of many rural people in times past has been and at present is dull, monotonous, insecure, and lacking in recognition or appreciation by other people. For the greater happiness of the rural people themselves and for the greater contribution which they may make to the common good, it is desirable that these conditions be changed.

The time element is of fundamental significance in an analysis of the public interest in the use of rural land. We are not absolutely and finally assured that human society will continue to exist indefinitely on the earth, but that is the only reasonable assumption that can be taken from the stand-point of the public welfare. The atomic bomb may result in the annihilation of the human race at a relatively early date, but we would be unwise to base our land-use policy on that assumption. The Lord in His righteous wrath may wipe us into nothingness over night, but we cannot depend on it. We must plan for the indefinite continuation of the human race with its needs for food, clothing, shelter, and other things.

That means that land resources must be conserved to some degree

rather than wastefully exploited. If all the top soil on our crop-land is washed away or blown away in this generation, there won't be any for the next generation. Or if we cut down all our forests now and let fire ruin the natural second-growth, our children and our children's children won't have any lumber to build their houses. And the same goes for all our other land resources.

The exploitation of land resources may be highly profitable to the individual owner at the present time, but the public must take a much longer-run view of the matter in counting its gains and losses. As a nation, America has been very prodigal in the use of its land resources; and now some of the more serious costs of this prodigality have manifested themselves.

How do we stand in the matter of public policy with respect to these various interests at present? The answer appears to be that just now we have no clear-cut, definite policy on most of the issues involved. During the period from 1933 to 1941, the most important segment of our public policy with respect to agriculture was the effort to increase the money incomes of the farmers by means of the various programs of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. The essence of this effort, despite its changes in form, was always to reduce agricultural production so as to make supply more nearly fit the effective demand for farm products. That is, the A.A.A. tried to limit supply in order to raise prices, in which effort it achieved only a fair degree of success. The war has changed all that. The prices of farm products all together rose to an all-time high level, and there is still strong feeling on the part of consumers that they are too high. Consequently, there is considerable pressure at present against the continuation of Government support of farm prices.

The Brannan Plan in its essence constitutes an effort to maintain farm incomes at a relatively high level, on the one hand, and to give consumers the benefit of somewhat lower retail food prices, on the other. How well it could do this and at what cost to the public treasury are highly controversial questions. It is at least to be commended, however, for distinguishing clearly between the problem of farm income and the problem of retail food prices. There may very well be cheaper and better ways of maintaining farm purchasing power than that of maintaining high prices for farm products, and the Brannan proposal has made a real contribution in directing our thinking in that direction. There appears, however, to be no genuine probability of the enactment of the plan into law in the near future. In the meantime, we shall apparently continue to struggle along with a patch-work of price support measures, with a gradual deterioration of farm purchasing power.

There was during the period of 1933 to 1941 also a very con-

siderable development of a movement to conserve rural land—crop-land, grass-land, timber-land, and recreational-land. As a matter of fact after 1935 the A.A.A. definitely attempted to link its acreage reduction and production control program with a conservation program. The Soil Conservation Service, another New Deal agency, particularly pursued such a program; and the Forest Service, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Reclamation Service, and some other "old-line" agencies made important contributions in the same general direction. To some extent, these conservation programs continued through the war; but obviously they were seriously weakened and handicapped. The exigencies of the war served to put almost the whole emphasis in public policy on increased output of food-stuffs and other products of rural land rather than upon the conservation of the land itself. Too much of the land in the Dust Bowl has been planted in wheat again. Much of our range-land has been severely overgrazed in an effort to satisfy the shrieking demand for meat. Too much of our available commercial timber has been cut for lumber, and the still desperate shortage of housing calls for the cutting of much more of it. In general, this is a period of "high pressure" farming and exploitation of rural land resources, which is to say that the advocates of conservation in its various aspects are getting little attention.

If the program of soil conservation is de-emphasized at this point, it will mean that the great job of conserving our soils and other rural land resources remains undone; for in spite of the splendid work which the government agencies, especially the Soil Conservation Service, have done since their establishment, the task is so gigantic that only a bare beginning on it has been made. The annual losses from erosion and other soil depleting forces still greatly exceed all forms of soil rehabilitation.

Although appropriations for the Soil Conservation Service were not reduced as much as appeared likely two years ago, the current scale of support is entirely inadequate in terms of the scope of the problem. The present program is simply nibbling around the edges, so to speak.

Another phase of New Deal policy with respect to agriculture was the assistance to tenant farmers in becoming farm owners under the Bankhead-Jones Act as administered by the Farm Security Administration and its successor, the Farmers Home Administration. The funds appropriated for this program were never large enough to make possible more than a "fringe" attack on the stupendous problem of farm tenancy, and it has received little impetus since the war.

The Farmers Home Administration has developed a vastly improved approach to the problem of extending supervised credit to farm tenants for the purchase of farms; but the very limited appropriations made for

the purpose, the absolute upper limits on the size of loans, and the unwillingness of the administrators to lend on the basis of currently inflated land values, have continued to confine the program to quite small proportions.

The pre-war flood control program which called for the treatment of the upper reaches of watersheds by the Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service by way of supplementing the large dams and other down-stream structures of the Army Engineers was abandoned entirely during the war, and there has been inordinate delay in its revival on any significant scale. The possibility of the creation of new watershed or regional agencies comparable to the Tennessee Valley Authority by the present Congress—or the next one—appears beset with many obstacles.

And as for the matter of “a good life” for rural people and others in terms of non-material and non-pecuniary values, one cannot reasonably expect Congress or any other political body to be much concerned with that sort of thing. Nobody ever has been except a few “agrarians” or other comparably ill-advised persons, and maybe a few of the rural people themselves.

As we stand now, the war has made our farmers and other users of rural land financially prosperous, relatively speaking. Most people are ready to regard that state of affairs as the full and final solution of the “farm problem” as it existed during the 1920’s and the 1930’s. Obviously, of course, they want a continuing large output from the farms, ranches, and the forests of the country. There is even some reason to believe that they may be willing to send relatively large quantities of food to Western Europe and possibly to China for relief purposes. But with respect to the broader problems of conservation of land resources, basic reform of rural land tenure, and the improvement of the non-material aspects of rural life, the general public simply does not seem to be concerned, which is to say that our present public policy toward rural land falls far short of full protection of the public interests in its use.

Thus, an answer to the question of what constitute the public interests in the use of rural land involves, of necessity, some philosophy of the nature of the public welfare. To put the same thought in another way, we may say that the ways in which rural land is used constitute a part of our economic system; and then the question arises as to what is the purpose of our economic system. The obvious answer to this question and one which most of our people are inclined to accept as the final and only answer is that the purpose of our economic system is to produce the greatest possible quantity of goods and services in the shortest possible time—and then to continue the process indefinitely. (Most of the people

who feel this way about the matter simply assume without giving it much thought that once the goods and services are produced they will be equitably distributed as a matter of course among the people who have had a part in their production. The economic maladjustments of the 1930's may have cast some doubt upon the perfection of this process at the time, but such matters have been largely forgotten since then.)

If this concept of the purpose of our economic system be accepted, the best use of rural land is that of exploitation of it with large scale, mechanical equipment with little or no regard for its continuing productivity. The assumption of this ideology with respect to any particular resource is that by the time it is exhausted our advancing technology will have discovered and developed a substitute for it. And it must be admitted that this has actually been done in a considerable number of cases.

It appears somewhat doubtful, however, that a satisfactory substitute for the soil will be forthcoming. There are numerous regions of the world which in ages past lost their soil through erosion and other destructive forces and have never regained it or developed anything to take its place. Under the proper conditions, nature will build new soil; but the process is extremely slow and the requirements highly exacting. Therefore, in spite of high prices, political change, underconsumption of food both here and abroad, it is in the public interest to conserve our soil and other rural land resources. We must save the soil in order that the soil may save the people. We should continue to strive for *balance* and *integration* of the public interests in the use of rural land in order that the public welfare may be as well served as possible.

Principles of Grants-In-Aid

HARRY P. B. JENKINS

University of Arkansas

Grants-in-aid and various kinds of subsidies are coming to be among the most important devices in our public finance.¹ They are also the subjects of a growing volume of discussion and controversy. Yet neither in the multitudinous grants programs themselves nor in the literature on public finance can there be observed a consistent adherence to any generally accepted body of principles or criteria of grants.² The undisciplined nature of this fiscal and literary growth is a surprising phenomenon, because we have long possessed a well-developed body of accepted principles which are directly applicable to grants programs and which provide the criteria necessary for guidance in judging the merits of existing programs of grants as well as in constructing new programs of that kind. This body of criteria consists of the accepted canons or principles of taxation, which can be applied to grants because grants are mathematically and economically of the nature of *negative taxes*.³

Although the literature contains some examples of the application of certain canons of taxation to specific types of governmental grants, it contains no systematic attempts to apply those principles to all kinds of such grants. This omission is most notable in the case of governmental subsidies and grants-in-aid paid by one government to other units of governments. Yet not only are such taxes conceptually possible, they have existed in fact.⁴ Therefore, subsidies and grants-in-aid paid by federal (state) governments to state (local) governmental units can logically be treated as the negative of taxes levied by federal (state) governments upon state (local) governments.

This paper represents an attempt to turn a number of generally accepted

¹Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditure, *Federal Subsidies and Grants-in-Aid to States*, U. S. Senate Document No. 13, 80th Congress, 1st Session. (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1947).

²U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Review of State and Local Government Finance*, State and Local Government Special Studies, No. 25. (Washington 25, D. C., 1948).

³For bibliographies of the literature on intergovernmental finance see the following doctoral dissertations: James M. Buchanan, *Fiscal Equity in a Federal State*, and Harry P. B. Jenkins, *Financing Adequate Public Services in Nova Scotia*. (University of Chicago, 1948).

⁴"A grant is a negative tax and, therefore, to every proposition regarding taxes, there corresponds a proposition regarding grants." (Hugh Dalton, *Principles of Public Finance*, 14th Impression, Rutledge, London, 1945, p. 207).

⁵Perhaps the best known case of intergovernmental taxation is the federal levy upon the states (the Matrikular Beitraege) in Imperial Germany. (See a *Statesman's Year Book* of that period for details).

canons of taxation about; and then to examine their meanings and implications in this field of *negative taxation*, for the purpose of discovering "points to notice", as well as standards of excellence on each point, which the judges of intergovernmental subsidies and grants-in-aid should know. For purposes of brevity the following discussion is confined almost exclusively to federal grants to the states; and no attempt is made to relate the discussion to any specific program of actual federal grants to states, or to any of the diverse theories of such grants found in recent and current literature.

Productivity or Fiscal Adequacy

Applied to taxation, the principle of *Fiscal Adequacy* means that the proposed tax must produce the required revenue. This principle is usually placed at the head of the list, because, no matter what other good features a tax may have, it must produce the required revenue in order to be retained as a useful fiscal instrument. Turning this principle about to make it face the direction taken by the flow of the grants payments gives the following criterion of grants-in-aid: Will this program of grants produce the level of benefits which it is intended to produce?

This criterion can be applied *only* when the total benefit intended to be produced with the assistance of the grants program, as well as the total need for that benefit, can *both* be measured or estimated in some objective and comparable terms. For only in such cases can the adequacy of the benefit be judged. If, for example, the program in question were a federal subsidy paid to wool growers in order to insure an adequate supply of wool in time of war, the wartime needs and the volume of production expected to be achieved with the help of the subsidy could both be estimated in terms of millions of pounds of wool of given qualities per year. But in cases where the amount of need and the amount of benefit are both intangible quantities and qualities, as in the case of public education, these comparative estimates are very difficult to make, because they have to be made in terms of various indices which afford an *indirect* comparison. For example, the quantity and quality of public education provided in a community can be roughly measured by such indices as number and training of teachers, number and capacity of classrooms, libraries, etc. Similarly, the provision for public health can be roughly indicated by the number and qualifications of doctors and nurses, the number of hospital beds, etc. For comparisons between states, the relative amounts of these intangible benefits available in the different states *at the same time* are often roughly indicated by comparisons of cost or expenditure, in dollars. Thus the amount of the benefit is indirectly indicated by the capacity of the service which provides the benefit, in these cases of intangibles.

The total amount of *need* for the benefit in question is commonly calculated from some standard of adequacy which the community wants or intends to provide for itself. For example, a federal program of aid to state and local public health and educational services might use some national average level of these services as the standard from which to calculate the amounts of need for these services in the individual states. Or it might use what has come to be known as the "national minimum".

If no comparable estimates of need and intended benefit can be made, then the criterion of Fiscal Adequacy cannot be applied, and expenditure on the grants program in question would be an outright gamble. On the other hand, if this criterion can be applied, but the test shows that the employment of the grants program could not be depended upon to result in *at least* the selected minimum level of adequacy in the aided function, then the grants program could not pass the test for fiscal adequacy.

Economy

In the field of (positive) taxation, the principle of Economy calls for minimizing the discrepancy between the flow of economic values represented by the revenue received at the treasury, on the one hand, and the direct and indirect cost to the taxpaying public of getting that revenue to the treasury, on the other hand. In the case of grants, this relationship is inverted. That is, the principle of Economy here calls for *maximizing* the discrepancy between the flow of economic values represented by the grants payments, on the one hand, and the direct and indirect increase in national real income or welfare produced by the grants program, on the other hand. From this inversion comes the following tests for Economy in a grants program: Is the additional benefit produced by the program unwarrantably low in relation to the total size of the grants payments? Are the grants payments unwarrantably high in relation to the additional benefit which the grants program is capable of producing?

In comparing the aggregate size of the grants payments with the additional benefit intended to be produced by the program, the size of the grants payments is measured in terms of "opportunity cost", i.e., the benefits which could be realized from the best alternative use of the purchasing power represented by the grants, under prevailing political and economic conditions.

In order to satisfy the criterion of Economy, a grants program must, first of all, be judged capable of "breaking even" at some scale of expenditure. This minimum necessary condition means that, in the opinion of the judges of the program, there is a scale of expenditure at which the additional benefit that can be imputed to the use of the grants program would at least equal the opportunity cost of the program.

Any really "profitable" program of grants should, of course, do better

than merely "break even" in the sense described. But the most promising grants program may fail to become a "profitable" investment of public funds for many reasons. Three of these reasons will be mentioned here. First, the cost of administering the program may be excessive, thus diverting more purchasing power away from the main purpose of the program than would be needed for efficient administration. Second, the total of the grants payments may be unnecessarily high, in relation to the potential productivity of the program, because of the distribution pattern of the grants payments. This point is examined below, in the section on Justice and Impartiality.⁵ Third, the scale of expenditure on the program may be too large (or too small), because of the practical difficulty of determining the exact scale of expenditure which would maximize the excess of total additional benefit over total opportunity cost. That scale of expenditure is the one at which the marginal benefit derived from the aided function just equals the marginal (opportunity) cost of the grants program.

Justice and Impartiality

The essence of tax justice lies in the adjustment of the tax to the circumstances of the individual taxpayer according to some consistent formula that is generally accepted as equitable and desirable, and which can be applied with impartiality, i.e., without discrimination against any individual taxpayer. Since the two most important causes of differences in the circumstances of individual taxpayers are their incomes and their family responsibilities, these two factors are generally regarded as the two most important variables to which the tax liabilities of individuals ought to be adjusted. The personal net income tax is the type of taxation that is capable of being most exactly adjusted to the two factors mentioned. For that reason, the personal net income tax will be used here as the model of just and impartial taxation.

In this paper, only one application of the principles of Justice and Impartiality to grants programs will be investigated. That one application is to federal grants-in-aid of some state (and local) service, such as public education. These federal grants-in-aid will be regarded as the negative of federal taxes levied on the states, with the state governments pictured in the role of collecting agencies. The immediate problem here, is, therefore, that of securing a just and impartial distribution of that (negative) taxation among the different states.

A simple model of a personal net income tax can be represented by the equation, $T = R(Y - eF)$. The *object* of taxation is the taxpayer's net income, Y . The basis for exemption allowances is the number of mem-

⁵See Table 1 for arithmetical illustrations.

bers in his family, F . His total exemption allowance is found by multiplying the number of members of his family by the standard rate of exemptions, e , e.g. \$700. The *tax base*, therefore, is $(Y-eF)$. The *statutory rate* of taxation, R , is the rate shown in the tax schedule opposite a tax base of that size. And the *effective rate* of levy on his net income is T/Y , the amount of his tax bill divided by the amount of his net income.

The equation for this tax model can be converted to a grants equation by first changing signs and then substituting symbols more appropriate to the case of grants. Changing signs would convert the tax equation to: $-T = R(eF-Y)$. Since a grant is a negative tax, the $-T$ can be represented by G , the amount of the grants payment to a single state. Then substituting N in place of F , and dropping e for the moment, will give: $G = R(N-Y)$.

In this inverted equation, the *object* of the "negative taxation" is now N , the total amount of *need* (for the aided service) in the individual state, expressed in dollars. The basis for "exemption allowances" in this negative taxation now shifts to the Y , which here represents the aggregate income which can be tapped by state and local taxation.

Since the Y is already in dollars, the rate of the "exemption allowance" *per dollar* of Y can most conveniently be stated as a fraction or percentage of Y . Here it will be represented by r . The completed calculation for this simple model of grants will then be: $G = R(N-rY)$. The *grants base* is, therefore, $(N-rY)$. And in this grants base, the rY represents the total of the individual state's *negative* "exemption allowance." And just as the tax would take nothing from the income-recipient until his taxable net income had risen above his total exemption allowance, so the grants program would give nothing to the state until its rY had fallen below its N . The *statutory rate* of grant is R ; and the *effective rate* of grant is G/N .

A calculation equation in this form, $G = R(N-rY)$, with both R and r greater than zero and the same for all states, will give *effective rates* of grant on N which will vary directly with the N/Y ratios of the different states. And states with identical N/Y ratios would receive identical effective rates of grant on their N 's. Grants distributed in this manner are called "variable percentage grants," meaning variable percentages of N .

This calculation equation can be simplified for purposes of this discussion by setting the statutory rate of grant, R , at 100 per cent, or 1. In this simplified equation, $G = N-rY$, the r would represent the *maximum* combined state and local "tax burden" imposed upon the individual state by compliance with the grants law.

Two special points may be noted in passing. First, there is nothing in these principles of Justice and Impartiality to prevent any state from

expending more on the aided services than the maximum required for compliance with the grants program, should it choose to do so. Exact interstate equality of expenditure per unit of need on state and local governmental services is not a necessary condition for the satisfaction of any principle of public finance.

The second point is that, since the simplified calculation equation, $G = N-rY$, would make amounts of grants payments vary dollar-for-dollar with changes in $(N-rY)$, this equation represents the ultimate degree of impartiality or "equal treatment," in the sense of exact adjustment of grant payments to the N 's and Y 's of the individual states which receive the grants.

The principle of *progressive* (negative) taxation could be introduced into the calculation equation by the use of a progressive statutory rate schedule in place of the constant R in the flat-percentage model, $G = R(N-rY)$, used in this paper. The principle of progression, applied on the model of the United States Individual Income Tax, would call for statutory rates which varied *inversely* with the size of the grants base, $(N-rY)$.

While the introduction of progression into the distribution of the grants would start many awkward controversies, it is equally clear that the distribution of those grants according to the principle of *regression* is a violation of current opinions of tax justice. If, therefore, proportional taxation be accepted as the minimum degree of tax justice to the lower income taxpayers (and to the less prosperous states), then it is possible to condemn most of the present federal grants-in-aid programs at once, on the grounds of their failure to reach even that minimum standard of justice. For most of our present grants-in-aid programs are of the type known as fixed-percentage matching grants. The usual case is where the federal government exactly matches the state expenditure. In terms of our calculation equation, this would mean that the federal government paid 50 percent of the N , while the state put up the other 50 percent of N . Therefore, these are cases of fixed 100 percent matching grants.

These fixed-percentage matching grants distribute the grants payments in a manner comparable to *regressive taxation*. For they impose the *highest* tax burdens on the states with the highest N/Y ratios, i.e., on those states which are *least* able to support the aided services out of their own taxable resources. Consequently, the use of fixed-percentage matching grants follows the principle of "them that has, gits"; except in the particular case where the fixed percentage of N contributed by the grants-paying government is 100 percent. In that case, the state's contribution to N would be zero, and no tax load for the aided services would be involved at the state (and local) level.

The statistics might indeed show cases where the poorer states, under a system of fixed-percentage matching grants, were actually *not* expending a higher percentage of their own taxable resources on the aided services than is required on the richer states. But these are probably *fictitious* cases of "equal treatment". Where the state (and local) tax burdens are found to be *no higher* in the poorer than in the richer states, it will probably be found that the total volume of expenditure on the aided services is too low to produce a tolerable level of adequacy in those services, because those poorer states were unable to raise enough revenue to match the federal money allotted to them. Therefore, another important point to notice in applying the test for Justice and Impartiality is this question of purely fictitious equality of treatment with respect to tax burden, which turns out to be inadequate support of the services being aided by the grants program. In fact, there may even be cases of "operation rat-hole" produced by this fixed-percentage matching system. The poorer states, because of their inability to match the federal money allotted to them, might be unable to provide the services at the *minimum* level required to protect the national interest; whereas the richer states would be receiving larger grants than they needed. In such a case, the grants program would be neither economical nor fiscally adequate.

Conversely, there may be cases where the poorer states are expending a *larger* fraction of their own taxable resources in support of some nationally-important service than they would be required to expend under a just and impartial program of grants-in-aid. Consequently, a grants program in which the aid is distributed with the minimum degree of justice and impartiality represented by that simplified calculation equation would allow the relatively poorer states to shift some of their expenditure away from the aided services of national importance to other governmental functions of local importance. Therefore, the judges of any grants program should inquire into the possibility of the poorer states (or localities) being obliged, by the method used to calculate their grants, to carry a higher tax burden in support of services of national importance than is imposed upon the more prosperous states (or localities).

Two final points are illustrated by Table 1. The first of those points is that the principles of Justice and Impartiality can be satisfied in the distribution of the grants-in-aid at *least cost* to the federal government by giving no grants at all to the states whose rY 's are equal to or greater than their N 's. Thus in the first column of grants, G_1 , the fourth and fifth states are shown to receive zero grants. And the total of that column of grants is the lowest of the four columns of grants.

The second point illustrated by Table 1 is that, if it is not considered desirable to give zero grants to the states with the lowest N/Y ratios, it is still possible to give shares of the grants to all states, using a calculation

TABLE I
*Grants-in-Aid Received by Five States Under Different
 Methods of Distributing the Grants.¹ (Amounts in
 Millions of Dollars.)*

State	N	Y	G ₁ (r = 3.3%)	G ₂ (r = 5%)	G ₃ Fixed 50% of N, equal matching by states.	G ₄ (r = 0) Fixed 100% of N, no matching by states.
1	8	100	3	4.7	4	8
2	16	100	11	12.7	8	16
3	16	200	6	9.4	8	16
4	10	200	0	3.4	5	10
5	16	400	0	2.8	8	16
—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	66	1000	20	33.0	33	66

¹Grants are calculated from the equation, $G = N-rY$, except for the third column of grants, G_3 . The "productivity" of the aid program, in terms of amount of total benefit produced with the aid of the grants, is assumed to be identical under the four alternative methods of distributing the grants.

equation modelled on the personal net income tax, at no greater total cost to the federal government than it has to pay when using the equal-matching type of grants. This is illustrated by the equality of the totals of the second and third columns of grants in Table 1.

Therefore, the judges of any program of grants-in-aid should investigate the possibility of introducing a greater degree of Justice and Impartiality into the method of distributing the grants, without additional cost—or even at a reduced cost—to the grants-paying government.

Other Principles

The other principles of taxation can be applied directly to grants-in-aid with little special adaptation.

(a) *Avoidance and Evasion:* The grants-spending governments are in a position to thwart the purpose of the grants program, and to reduce its effectiveness as an instrument for serving the general welfare, in numerous and obvious ways. This fact is a consequence of the greatest weakness of all grants programs; namely, that the grants-spending governments are not required to give an exactly equivalent *quid pro quo* in return for the public funds entrusted to them. This weakness accounts for the popularity (in the United States, especially) of "conditional grants"—that is, grants made for specific purposes and with the grants-paying govern-

ment (which is finally responsible to the public for the use made of the granted funds) explicitly reserving the right to scrutinize the actual utilization of the granted funds. In the case of federal grants to the states, this surveillance by the federal authorities has given rise to outcries against federal "intervention" in state affairs.

Short of the final and heroic remedy of stopping the grants in cases of flagrant misuse and waste of the granted funds—a remedy which is not only difficult to take in a democracy, but which may be nearly as bad as the disease, since the benefits which the grants program was intended to produce would still be lacking—there are two general conditions which, while perhaps not entirely sufficient in themselves to prevent all diversion of the granted funds from their most efficient use, should nevertheless reduce the waste of those funds.

The first and most nearly sufficient of these two conditions is that the grants programs are employed in aid of projects the *immediate* purpose of which is the production of *tangible*, measurable and easily observed and appraised goods, such as, for example, paved highways of some specified quality. When the grants are made to help finance projects of that kind, the officials and legislators of the grants-paying government, as well as newspaper reporters and large numbers of the general public, can scrutinize the results of the grants program and appraise them from the point of view of adequacy and economy.

The second of these two general conditions is the presence of a strong *local* interest in the function aided by the grants program. Grants-in-aid are economical only when they produce an addition to the general welfare *at least* equal to that which could be produced by the best alternative use of the revenues involved. But it is highly doubtful if grants can be expected to "break even", in this sense, if given in aid of functions towards which the people in the several states and localities are apathetic. Be that as it may, when the general interest concerns services or benefits of an *intangible* nature, such as public health and education, the only reasonably sufficient protection against evasion and avoidance is a strong *local* interest in the success of the aided services, and not merely in getting the grants payments.

(b) *Flexibility*: This quality is just as important in a grants-in-aid program as in a tax structure. There are two practical methods of varying the grants program to keep it adjusted to changing circumstances. One of these methods is the annual (or biennial) reviewing and adjusting of the program by the legislative body which makes the appropriations for the grants. The disadvantage of this method is the frequency with which the program (often of a controversial nature) must be debated, and the resulting atmosphere of uncertainty, which might hamper forward plan-

ning by the grants-spending agencies. The chief advantages of this method are the publicity given to the program, and the more exact and timely adjustments which could be made.

The second practical method of keeping the grants program adjusted to changing circumstances consists of a combination of (1) automatic adjustments through the use of good calculation equations, (2) the greatest possible degree of freedom and discretion on the part of the state and local administrators, and (3) periodical review and revision by the legislators who appropriate the money for the grants.

(c) *Simplicity*: The dictionary definition of "simplicity" that best conveys the meaning of this principle of taxation is "the state of being not complex, or of consisting of few parts." Simplicity in this sense is not merely a principle of taxation; it is, in fact, one of the nine principles of war, as well as the ideal of ultimate perfection in construction of machines, in business organization, and in methods of production. Whenever a plan or program has to be carried out by large numbers of people, the more complicated it is the greater is the probability of failure. In war, especially, military leaders have learned to look with suspicion upon complicated plans. In short, in every field of human activity, the simple, uncomplicated plan or program is the one that is most likely to achieve success. And this principle applies to grants-in-aid programs just as well as to any other field of human activity. If the grants program is very complicated, it is more likely than not to degenerate into another "operation rathole."

Consequently, the judges of any grants-in-aid program should ask this question: Is this program simple enough to give reasonable assurance of success, under the conditions in which it will have to be carried out?

(d) *Convenience*: The word "convenience" has several meanings; but the dictionary meaning which this word carries as a principle of taxation is as follows: "Absence of that which annoys or discommodes; appropriateness of time or of place." Thus a convenient tax would be one that could be paid at the most convenient times and places, and in the most convenient manner.

First of all, when we turn this principle about, it is apparent that the *payer* is now the grants-paying government. Generally speaking, the more built-in *automatic* adjustments to changing circumstances a grants-program has and the more local autonomy it permits in the detailed administration of the program, the more convenient it will be to both legislative and executive branches of the grants-paying governments. Conversely, the more those adjustments have to be made from year to year, with the resulting opportunities for log-rolling and pressure from special-interest groups, the more inconvenient and annoying the program will be.

to the grants-paying government. In short, there can be "nuisance grants", just as there are "nuisance taxes". And there is no satisfactory solution for this inconvenience to the grants-paying government, although the inconvenience can usually be reduced by the methods indicated above.

Secondly, grants programs may be exceedingly inconvenient to the grants-spending governments, both financially and administratively. For the use of grants-in-aid presupposes the existence of a high degree of local fiscal autonomy in the state and localities. Consequently, the situation often arises where a local government has committed its resources to some project of local importance, e.g., a street and highway paving program, when the grants-paying government comes along with a grants-in-aid program for some entirely different function, e.g., public health.

In such a situation, if—as is usually the case—the grants-in-aid program offers "matching grants", the locality is placed in a very annoying dilemma. On the one hand, if it continues with its own program, it may not have enough revenue to match the grants-in-aid offered; on the other hand, if, through reluctance to lose the proffered grants, it puts up the matching funds, then it will either have to reduce expenditure on its own local program, or promptly raise local taxes or borrow money. Any way that local government takes to get out of that dilemma is certain to be very inconvenient to it and to the taxpayers under its jurisdiction.

There is only one complete solution of this problem of financial inconvenience to the grants-spending governments; and that is a very expensive solution. It is for the grants-paying government to pay 100 percent of the cost of the functions or services which the grants are intended to aid. Short of that, the financial inconvenience to the states or localities can be reduced, and a powerful incentive to compliance offered to those least able to raise the matching funds, by distributing the grants according to a variable percentage formula, such as an equation modelled upon a personal net income tax.

A second kind of inconvenience to the grants-spending agencies is caused when the terms under which the grants are paid are set forth in great detail by the grants-paying government. Such grants programs may prove too inflexible for effective and economical application to the details of local conditions. Too much detail written into the grants program by the grants-paying government may frustrate even the most conscientious efforts of the local administrators, and turn the whole program into another "operation rathole". Therefore, the grants-paying government should lay down the general *intention* or *purpose* of the program, and then confine its surveillance of the program mainly to *results*, leaving the detailed *methods* of achieving those results to the local authorities. This is the procedure followed in the most dangerous and critical

of all human activities, namely, war, in which the consequences of a misuse of resources are likely to be far more disastrous than they could be in any grants-in-aid program.

(e) *Certainty*: When this time-honored principle is applied to grants-in-aid, its meaning is unchanged. The highest feasible degree of certainty is beneficial to both the grants-paying and the grants-receiving governments. The officials of both governments should be able to compute the amounts of grants payments (with which they are immediately concerned) directly from the law which authorizes the grants program. Then the grants-paying government would not be continually harassed by pressures from discontented grants-receiving governments in search of increased shares of the grants. Similarly the grants-receiving governments would be able to compute the amounts to which they are entitled under the law, and can make their plans accordingly.

It is apparent from the meaning of this criterion that only "formula grants", i.e., grants distributed on the basis of definite calculation equations, will meet this test of certainty.

Unfortunately, too much certainty in a grants program—especially in the matters of duration and continuity—may conflict with other desirable features of the program. For example, too much certainty in the duration of a specific grants program may aggravate the problems of Avoidance and Evasion, by postponing the "day of reckoning", and hence affect the fiscal adequacy and economy of the whole program.

Therefore, the judges of the grants program should ask: Are the kinds and degrees of certainty provided in the grants program best adapted to promote the Fiscal Adequacy and Economy of the whole program?

Conclusion

The accepted canons of taxation apparently provide a body of criteria on the basis of which any program of intergovernmental grants-in-aid can be judged. And these criteria, like the principles of war, are individually very simple and easy to grasp. The difficulty in adhering to them would appear only when an attempt is made to apply them to a given grants program under a given set of circumstances. For the accurate application of these criteria to any specific grants-in-aid program may require the collection and appraising of vast amounts of information, not only in connection with the method of distributing the grants themselves, but also about the benefit which they are intended to produce and the benefits which could be obtained through alternative uses of the public funds involved. Moreover, since any one program of grants is unlikely to satisfy every one of these criteria in the same degree, the

problem of choosing between alternative grants programs would, in actual practice, become the problem of choosing the "best fit".

But these technical difficulties of application, as well as this practical problem of choosing the "best fit", are found in the use of any set of general principles of human activity, including those for (positive) taxation. Indeed, the use of a general body of criteria in appraising different grants programs is made relatively easy by the fact that these programs are usually the objects of active support and opposition. Consequently, the burden of proving that their proposals satisfy these criteria to a degree acceptable to the majority of the congressmen, legislators or voters who have to make the decisions, can be placed squarely upon those who advocate the adoption of any new grants program or the modification of any existing grants program.

Finally, those who are charged with the duty of choosing between rival grants programs would have to arrange these criteria in some order of priority. And the order of priority selected would, of course, be influenced by the individual opinions of the judges of the programs. Nevertheless, the examination of these criteria in this paper would appear to have narrowed the area of possible disagreement on that order of priority. For this examination has shown that the basic criteria are the first three listed, namely, Fiscal Adequacy, Economy, and Justice combined with Impartiality. The other criteria are important chiefly because failure to satisfy them would probably render a given program of grants unable to satisfy the three basic criteria.

Goodnow's Theory of Politics

J. AUSTIN RANNEY

University of Illinois

Writers in public administration have long been preoccupied with Frank J. Goodnow's argument that all governmental activities can be classified as either "politics" or "administration," and that each should be assigned to separate agencies.¹ Some have used it as the basis of their own analyses, while others have rejected or greatly qualified it; but nearly all have felt it necessary to deal with Goodnow's dictum in some fashion. Indeed, the emergence of "public administration" as a differentiated area of study within American political science may be said to date from the appearance of *Politics and Administration*.²

One aspect of Goodnow's general position has received far more discussion than the rest: his belief that "politics" should be kept out of "administration" in order that the latter may more efficiently and economically carry out the orders of the former. Some writers, apparently considering efficiency and economy to be primary governmental goals, have expanded this idea into an argument for a considerable degree of administrative autonomy, and regard Goodnow as the founder of their point of view. Thus J. M. Pfiffner, for example, opens his discussion of the relationship between politics and administration by quoting Goodnow's exposition approvingly and then premising that "the keystone of the new public administration [is] the conclusion that politics should stick to its policy-determining sphere and leave administration to apply its own technical processes free from the blight of political meddling."³ Other writers, however, deny that "politics" *can* be separated from "administration," and argue that the real problem is the establishment of democratic controls over *all* parts of the governing process. Many of them appear to regard Goodnow as an opponent whose position they must refute before they can establish their own.⁴

In the present writer's opinion, both groups, by focusing upon only two aspects of Goodnow's general position, have demonstrated their failure to perceive its essential nature. In the course of *Politics and Administration* Goodnow raised these four main questions: (1) Are "poli-

¹As first expounded in his seminal work, *Politics and Administration* (Macmillan, 1900), pp. 9-20.

²For a description of the significance of Goodnow's analysis for the subsequent literature of public administration, see Dwight Waldo's valuable survey, *The Administrative State* (Ronald, 1948), pp. 106-11, 114-23.

³*Public Administration* (Ronald, 1935), p. 9. For other examples of this point of view, see the bibliographical note in Waldo, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁴Cf. Waldo, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-9.

tical" activities sufficiently different from "administrative" activities that there is value in considering one apart from the other? (2) What "political" institutions will most accurately express the popular will? (3) By what machinery may "politics" most effectively control "administration" and thereby make sure that the popular will is translated into governmental action? And (4) how may "administration" be organized to carry out its orders in the most faithful as well as efficient manner possible? His answers to (1) and (4) have received an overwhelming proportion of the attention given his work by subsequent writers; but the bulk of his analysis was devoted to finding answers for (2) and (3). Goodnow's overall concern, in fact, was with finding the best way of organizing democratic government. His concern with administration was that of fitting it into the whole democratic picture, and he never attempted to construct a theory of government upon the premise that the important thing is to make administration "efficient" and "economical."⁶

Thus Goodnow regarded the second of these questions as the most important, since it is logically prior to the third; and much of *Politics and Administration* is an attempt at answering it. The answer which emerges may be summed up as an adherence to the doctrine of responsible party government which was then also being developed by such men as Woodrow Wilson, A. Lawrence Lowell, and Henry Jones Ford,⁷ and which has recently been revived by such writers as Professors E. E. Schattschneider and Herman Finer.⁸ The purpose of this essay is to summarize and evaluate Goodnow's theory of politics and its relationship to his attitude toward administration, not only to place him more accurately in the history of American political science, but also because many of the questions he raised are of such a fundamental nature that, in the present writer's opinion, they must be faced up to by every modern student of "politics" and "administration."

Democracy and Political Parties

Goodnow's theory of party government was grounded in the belief that democracy does not mean direct popular participation in the day-to-day activities of government on the town-meeting model. In particular he attacked the reformist polemics of Albert Stickney, S. E. Moffett, and Charles C. P. Clark. These writers argued that democracy cannot

⁶See V. O. Key, "Politics and Administration," in *The Future of Government in the United States*, L. D. White, ed. (Chicago, 1942), pp. 145-6, for a similar assessment of Goodnow's attitude toward the place of administration.

⁷Primarily in these works: Wilson, *Congressional Government* (Houghton- Mifflin, 1885) and *Constitutional Government in the United States* (Columbia, 1908); Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (Harvard, 1913); and Ford, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics* (Macmillan, 1898).

⁸Schattschneider in *Party Government* (Farrar-Rinehart, 1942), *passim.*; and Finer in *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (Methuen, 1932), I, ch. 12.

be said to exist unless the people do thus participate in government; and they concluded that all organizations—such as political parties—which interpose themselves between the sovereign citizen and his government will have to be by-passed or destroyed if genuine democracy is to be achieved in the United States.⁸ Democracy of that sort may exist in some rural New England areas, Goodnow conceded; but it is ridiculous to expect it to operate in highly-populated urban centers.⁹ In any such place ". . . the attainable in democratic government is not as much the deliberate choice of officers and the positive determination of policies by the people, as the power of veto and the power to change party leaders . . ."¹⁰

Goodnow, then, conceived of democracy as government *responsible* to the people, and not as government *carried on* by them. This responsibility can best be established, he further contended, by the periodical choice of the people between two political parties, so that the party, in whom the people as a whole do not have confidence, shall retire from the active control of the government, and that party leaders who in like manner have forfeited the confidence of the party shall retire from active control of the party.¹¹

The first function political parties should therefore perform in any democracy, Goodnow argued, is to establish responsibility of the government to the people.¹² His model for how this should be done was party government as he conceived it to operate in England, where the fact that political responsibility is, comparatively speaking, easily fixed, that the people may force out of power political leaders who do not possess their confidence, makes the whole system one in which popular government is easily secured. For the party is made responsible and the leaders of the party who are the leaders of the government make the whole system a responsible one.¹³

The essence of popular control through party government is the substitution of *party* responsibility to the whole electorate for the individual responsibility of each representative to his particular constituency: . . . It is important, if harmony in government is desirable, that all the candidates of

⁸Stickney, *The Political Problem* (Harper, 1890); Moffett, *Suggestions on Government* (Rand-McNally, 1894); and Clark, *The "Machine" Abolished and the People Restored to Power* (Putnam, 1900).

⁹*Municipal Problems* (Columbia, 1907), pp. 174-80. See also *ibid.*, p. 154; and *Municipal Government* (Century, 1909), pp. 154-5.

¹⁰*Politics and Administration*, p. 248. See also *ibid.*, p. 149.

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 151-2. By the "party" whose confidence the party leaders may forfeit, Goodnow meant all those voters who vote for its particular ticket. The considerable effect of this conception of party membership upon his general theory of politics will be discussed below.

¹²Goodnow, in this context, was talking only about the functions parties *should* perform—that is, he was here setting up his *ideal* of responsible party government. He was, to his credit, less guilty than most other writers on party of confusing the functions American parties *should* perform with those they *do* perform. Like the other "party government" writers, however, he believed that the English party system largely exemplified this ideal.

¹³*Politics and Administration*, p. 157.

one or the other of the great parties in a given administrative district should be elected. The individual candidates must be sunk to a large extent in the party. Individual responsibility must give place to party responsibility.¹⁴

Once it establishes the responsibility of the political side of the government to the people, Goodnow continued, party government should then perfect the control of "politics" over "administration." This control is essential to any democratic government; but it cannot be made effective unless the "political" agencies are strong, unified, and above all genuinely representative of public opinion. And only responsible party government can furnish such agencies.¹⁵

In the United States, moreover, the peculiar nature of the formal governmental structure is such that parties are called upon to perform certain other functions which do not fall to them, for example, in England. He agreed with Henry Jones Ford's analysis of the theoretical fallaciousness and harmful effects of the separation of powers, and underlined Ford's argument that parties are the only agency in the American system which work to induce the coordination and harmony between the executive and legislative branches which is indispensable if the government is to act effectively.¹⁶ Even more important, the Constitution makes political responsibility almost impossible, and responsibility, if it is to be found at all, must be found outside of the government and in the party which largely reflects the conditions existing in the government. The governmental system of checks and balances, whatever its advantages may be from other points of view, makes it difficult for the electors to hold public officers to account. For it is almost impossible under it to fix the blame or award the credit for any concrete thing that is done or left undone by the officers of the government. The electors must, therefore, look to the party . . . [which] is, under our present system, almost the only protection against anarchy, the only means of progress.¹⁷

In order successfully to accomplish their enormous tasks in a democratic manner, the parties must themselves be democratically organized.¹⁸ Above all, the party leaders must be responsible to the party members. And who are the "party members" who should control the leaders? Goodnow believed that they are all those voters who declare their allegiance to a particular party by signifying their wish to vote in its primary. He even disapproved of legal attempts to restrict party membership to those who can prove past party loyalty.¹⁹ In short, Goodnow held an extreme version of what Schattschneider refers to as the "association-of-partisans" conception of party membership.²⁰ And he believed that the party lead-

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 24, 128-31.

¹⁶*Municipal Government*, p. 104. For Ford's analysis, on which Goodnow leaned heavily, see *The Rise and Growth of American Politics*, pp. 73ff.

¹⁷*Politics and Administration*, pp. 174-5. See also *ibid.*, pp. 25-6, 128-31.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 27-8, 150-1. See also *The International Monthly*, I (June, 1900), p. 622.

¹⁹*Politics and Administration*, p. 234.

²⁰See his discussion of this conception in *Party Government*, pp. 54ff.

ers must be responsible to the party "members" in precisely the same sense that the parties themselves should be responsible to the voters at large—that, within his meaning of the terms, there must be democracy *within* the parties as well as *between* them. This conception of party membership and the notion of responsible party leadership based upon it did a great deal to shape his subsequent analysis of the existing American parties as well as his proposals for improving them.

The American Party System

Up to this point in the argument there is no important difference between Goodnow's position and that taken by the other "party government" writers. In judging the existing American parties by his ideal of party government, however, and in making proposals for their reform, he broke with their analysis in several important respects.

Goodnow's description of American parties, for one thing, is often so different from that offered by most other writers that the reader finds it difficult to believe that he was talking about the same party system.² The standard "party government" criticism of American parties is that, on the national level, they are weak, leaderless, and therefore incapable of the unified, responsible action party government demands. Goodnow's picture, by contrast, runs in term of rigid control by powerful bosses who, at all levels, whip their legislative puppets into line and grind out public policy in a despotic but highly efficient manner.³

The readiest explanation of this blind spot in his understanding is that Goodnow approached party politics at the national level on the basis of an uncriticised assumption that they differ in no important respect from party politics at the local level. Because of his life-long concern with the problems of municipal government, he was well aware of the strength of local machines and the power of local bosses;⁴ and he seems to have thought of a man like Mark Hanna as a "national boss" in exactly the same sense in which Richard Croker was a "local boss." In short, he believed our national parties are run with a discipline and unity compar-

²The "other writers" includes both those in Goodnow's time and those in our own. Wilson, Lowell and Ford pointed to substantially the same leading traits in American parties—weak party lines on matters of public policy, decentralization of control, and dominance by local bosses—that Schattschneider and Finer write about today. This suggests that the nature of the American party system has not materially changed since 1900. And the present writer therefore feels he may discuss Goodnow's analysis of American parties as though it had been written last week.

³Goodnow's works are liberally sprinkled with descriptions of this sort. See, for example, *Politics and Administration*, pp. 139-44, 169-75; and *Municipal Government*, pp. 104ff.

⁴His first published work, in fact, was the chapter (no. 88) he contributed to Bryce's *American Commonwealth* (Macmillan, 1889) on "The Tweed Ring in New York City."

able to that which he had observed in Tammany Hall, the only difference being that the national parties are primarily interested in policy and the local machines in patronage.*

Goodnow's investigation led him to conclude that American parties are incapable of providing genuinely democratic government, and that their basic malady is the fact that the party members are unable to hold the party leadership to account or to depose unpopular party leaders. Only when American parties themselves become "democratized," he believed, will they satisfactorily do their job.†

Although he took issue with the other "party government" writers on the question of *what* is wrong with American parties, Goodnow agreed with them upon the fundamental reason *why* they are as they are: the peculiar nature of our formal governmental structure, primarily in such things as the separation of powers and the proliferation of governmental units and elective offices produced by federalism. The Constitution, he believed, breeds boss-rule in two ways. First, it gives the parties such an enormous burden of work that they must have elaborate and well-disciplined organizations in order to do their job; and this, in turn, makes for boss-rule. Second, the Constitution drives parties entirely outside the formal government, and thereby forces them to operate entirely under their own rules, which for the most part are worked out secretly and irresponsibly by the bosses. The completely non-formal character of American parties is, in Goodnow's view, an irresistible invitation to the seizure and retention of power by irresponsible bosses; for, with no aid from the courts of law or any other official agency, the ordinary party members can unseat the bosses only by a "prolonged, continuous, and bitter struggle." And since there is no formal, legal way of financing party activities, it is not surprising that they turn to spoils and graft for support.‡

Goodnow's major prescription for the ills of the American party system depends upon changing the nature of party leadership. He expressly did not wish to destroy or even weaken it, for he believed that, given the functions American parties must perform, such leadership is both inevitable and desirable.* He sought instead to make the party leaders *legally* responsible to the party members through the institution of the direct primary. That basic reform, he was convinced, will establish intra-party responsibility. It will also draw the parties into the orbit of the formal government, give them official status, and thereby subject

**Politics and Administration*, pp. 144-6.

†*Ibid.*, pp. 165-6, 174, 197-8.

‡*Ibid.*, pp. 199-200, 164-5-, 105-8, 135-6, 206, 220-1, 108-9. See also *Municipal Government*, pp. 381-2, and *The International Monthly*, I (June, 1900), pp. 628-9.

**Politics and Administration*, pp. 195-8.

their internal processes to control by the courts.²⁹ Thus, with the breaking of the bosses' control, Goodnow concluded, American parties will become the democratically-organized agencies necessary for responsible party government. And only by the establishment of responsible party government can we hope for genuinely democratic government in the United States.

An Appraisal

The weaknesses of Goodnow's theory of politics are not difficult to discern, nor should they be minimized. Among the more obvious faults may be cited his failure to understand the nature of the existing American parties. His picture of them as rigidly disciplined and ruthlessly controlled on the national as well as local level had little relationship to the facts of American politics in his time and has no more validity in our own. Time has revealed the ineffectiveness of his panacea, the direct primary, for bringing about either the "purification" or "responsibility" of American parties which Goodnow expected it to accomplish; and for an incisive analysis of the theoretical deficiencies in Goodnow's argument which led him into this error, the reader can do no better than to read Henry Jones Ford's review of *Politics and Administration* printed nearly fifty years ago.³⁰

Goodnow's failure to face up to the real nature of American parties can perhaps best be explained by his uncritical acceptance of the "association-of-partisans" misconception of party membership. A "party member," in his opinion, is anyone who says he is; and this is the party member who has a *right* to participate in the determination of party policies. This right attaches to citizenship; and he seems to have thought of it as being of exactly the same nature and capable of the same kind of protection as the right to free speech or the writ of habeas corpus. He did not consider the difficulties involved in the notion of an association which, though voluntary, is yet of such a character that any person, merely by virtue of his citizenship, has a right to determine the association's policies without assuming any *obligation* whatsoever to the association. In view of his own conception of the parties' great tasks and their attendant need for strong leadership and effective discipline, Goodnow should have seen that his "right of membership" involves both a naive conception of rights and a fruitless conception of membership. He nevertheless based his entire analysis of what should be done about American parties upon this fundamental misconception.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 248-9, 166-7, 232-3-, 242, 110-3. See also *Municipal Problems*, pp. 167-8.

³⁰*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XVI (Sept. 1900), pp. 185ff.

Ultimately Goodnow's failures in his appraisal of American parties and their reform flow from his unwillingness to put first things first. If the analysis of the nature of democracy and the functions political parties must play therein upon which he based his argument is correct, then the great need is to achieve in American parties that unity of action on matters of public policy without which they cannot be responsible to the people. Having learned so many other valuable lessons from Ford, he might also have considered Ford's argument that when party unity-responsibility is achieved there seems to be a tendency for their internal processes to become more democratic and their leadership more responsive, as the development of English parties from 1720 to 1830 seems to show.²⁰ But "democratizing" the parties internally is unimportant compared with the immediate necessity, in Goodnow's own terms, of making the parties themselves responsible to the general electorate.

To recognize the limitations of Goodnow's theory of politics, however, is by no means to minimize his importance for present-day American political scientists, particularly those who consider themselves specialists in "administration." For Goodnow, in founding the separate study of public administration, proceeded upon a premise frequently overlooked by many of his subsequent "followers" in the field: that there can be no useful theory of the role of administration in a democracy without a prior and controlling conception of popular control. There can be, in short, no theory of democratic "administration" that does not grow out of a theory of democratic "politics."

Thus despite his attempt to differentiate between "politics" and "administration," Goodnow did not try to escape the implications of his general position by pleading that *his* job was to study only the latter and leave consideration of the former to the political theorists and/or the specialists on political parties. He developed a systematic theory of the institutional machinery best capable of translating the popular will into governmental action—and then attempted to assign to administration what he conceived to be its important, but subordinate role in that machinery. There is, to be sure, little in his theory of responsible party government that one cannot find elsewhere. But it remains one of the most thoroughgoing and forceful expositions available of perhaps the most viable institutional framework yet suggested within which an expert (but *not* independent) administration can operate.

Those students of public administration who are becoming convinced that "administration" cannot be studied entirely apart from "politics," and who are increasingly concerned with achieving a comprehensive view of the whole great problem of how to achieve genuinely democratic gov-

²⁰*The Rise and Growth of American Politics*, pp. 335-49.

ernment in the United States, are returning to rather than departing from the path actually marked out by *Politics and Administration*. A re-examination of that seminal work should be of considerable help, as well as an inspiration to them.

The Right of State Existence in International Law

H. B. JACOBINI
University of Kansas

Modern textbook writers frequently refer to the right of existence which states allegedly enjoy. While this right certainly is worthy of ample attention, it must be defined with great care, because the term seems to imply certain things which cannot always in reality be attributed to it.

While many of the earlier writers referred to the right of self-defense, few if any of them saw fit to speak of it as a right of existence *per se*. Representative of modern authorities, Hall observed that ". . . since states exist, and are independent beings, possessing property, they have the right to do whatever is necessary for the purpose of continuing and developing their existence . . ."¹ More recently Wilson suggested that "The right to exist is usually recognized by states . . .";² and Fenwick points out that international law has centered much of its emphasis on this right, observing that:

At times it is described as "national security," or as "the right of self-preservation," or the "right of self-defense," "the fundamental law," "the first law of nature" to which all other laws are subordinate.³

This right reduced to its basic meaning prior to 1919 could, in the abstract, have logically meant one of three things. First, it could have been taken to mean that a state had a mere right to protect itself (with various implications of that idea); secondly, it could have been interpreted to mean that since a state had a right to exist, other states were legally bound not to violate that existence; and thirdly, it could have been assumed that the community of nations was bound to respect and protect the right of all states to exist. While the cases of Poland in 1795 and Montenegro in 1919 show rather well the complete invalidity of the third possibility mentioned above, there is some evidence to show that the second possibility was at least considered plausible. Hall suggests that the various rights which states enjoy in regard to the preservation of their existence are nevertheless ". . . subject to the qualification that they are bound correlatively to respect these rights in others".⁴ This idea has certainly been amplified in recent years, but one must realize that while it was of limited importance before 1919, the first possibility mentioned above,

¹William Edward Hall, *A Treatise on International Law* (London, The Clarendon Press, 1904), p. 43.

²George Grafton Wilson, *International Law* (New York, Silver, Burdett and Company, 1935), p. 81.

³Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948), p. 228.

⁴Hall, *loc. cit.*

i.e., that a state had a mere right to protect itself, was the core of the idea.

In short, the right of existence was a legalistic concept which meant, for all practical purposes, that a state would be violating no rule of law if it chose to protect itself, and that if other states chose to help a given state to protect itself, they would also be within the law. This rule presumably has its origin in the natural law theories of an earlier day, and it is also a logical corollary of the state sovereignty theory.

With the formation of the League of Nations, however, a new development in this heretofore somewhat useless right of existence appears to have begun. Article X of the Covenant is a marked departure from earlier practices in that a state's "territorial integrity and existing political independence" are made matters which are to be "respected and *preserved*" against external aggression". This, of course, applied only to League members, but it would seem that the only ways in which a violation of a state's existence within the orbit of the League could legally remain merely a domestic question would be in the event of a state's splitting into fragmentary units or merging voluntarily in some sort of a union with another state or states.

Article XI of the Covenant, moreover, suggested even a broader possibility in that "Any war or threat of war . . . is declared a matter of concern to the whole League . . ." and that the League might take any action which would seem wise and efficacious in safeguarding "the peace of nations". This in itself was, of course, no legal guarantee of a state's existence, but coupled with Article X it marked an important step.

Article II, section four of the United Nations Charter carries this new idea—albeit somewhat precariously—into the realm of contemporary international law and organization, since it emphasizes that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the *territorial integrity or political independence*⁸ of any state . . ." This would seem to suggest clearly that the members of the United Nations (individually, at least) cannot legally threaten the existence of any state.

The Charter in Article I indicates that one of its purposes is to prevent aggression and maintain peace; the Charter furthermore sets up quite an elaborate procedure in the event of aggressive action which is a threat to the peace. It is evident that the great powers, while morally bound to uphold the Charter, are in a position to indulge in numerous legal fictions to justify a devastating use of the veto, and may thus circumvent all of their obligations regarding the extinction of any given state. Even in this

⁸Italics supplied.

⁹Italics supplied.

respect, however, the flagrant violation of Czechoslovakia has not altered that nation's legal existence *per se*, and the continued recognition of its legal existence by the Soviet Union can be taken as an indication, at least, of the acceptability of this doctrine to that government.

To approach the matter from a slightly different aspect, it may be profitably noted that when the countries of the western hemisphere drew up the Convention on Rights and Duties of States at Montevideo in 1933, they included these two stipulations which are of value in the question of concern in this paper:

Article 8. No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.

Article 11. The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily.⁷

Also in the realm of the inter-American movement is the Act of Chapultepec (1945) which includes a number of clauses which indicate that the signatory states not only are obliged to respect the existence of the other American states, but that an attempt to destroy or invade one of them will constitute an aggression against all.

(I) That in case the peace, security or territorial integrity of any American republic is threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, coordinating their respective sovereign will by means of the procedure of consultation, using the measures which in each case the circumstances may make advisable. (Declaration of Lima, Eighth International Conference of American States, 1938.)

(J) That any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against all the American States. (Declaration XV of the second meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Havana, 1940.)⁸

These two sub-sections of the preamble are cited to show rules of international law already in effect at least in some degree within the inter-American community. The following excerpts from the body of the Convention itself indicate their further amplification:

First. That all sovereign States are juridically equal amongst themselves.

⁷This convention with a brief commentary may be conveniently consulted in Llewellyn Pfankuchen, *A Documentary Textbook in International Law* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1940), pp. 17-19.

⁸"Inter-American Conference on War and Peace," in *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 39, p. 109.

Second. That every State has the right to the respect of its individuality and independence, on the part of the other members of the international community.

Third. That every attack of a state against the integrity or the inviolability of territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American state, shall, conformably to Part III thereof, be considered as an act of aggression against the other states which sign this declaration.

In any case, invasion by armed forces of one state into the territory of another, trespassing boundaries established by treaty and marked in accordance therewith, shall constitute an act of aggression.¹⁰

In the same year (1945) the Arab states which signed the pact of the Arab League agreed not to use force in the settlement of disputes among themselves, and also, that should any of them be invaded, the Council of the League would be convened to determine the measures necessary to repulse the invasion.¹¹

Most recently, the North Atlantic Pact imposes the obligation on all signatories collectively to exercise their rights of self-defense if any of them is attacked.

Article 5. The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be determined when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.¹²

There have, of course, been many other mutual defense pacts of a similar nature, but it is significant that they have come to encompass so vast a scope in recent years.

In conclusion, it is to be observed that while the right of any state to exist prior to 1919 could amount to little more than an assurance that a state's act of defending itself would be legal, the developments since the first world war show that not only are almost all states legally obliged to respect the integrity and existence of other states by virtue of conventional law, but in the event of a violation of a state's integrity or existence, most of the nations of the world are now legally bound to consider that violation either a matter of grave concern to them or to consider it an outright attack.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 110.

¹¹"Text of the Pact of the Arab League," in *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 39, pp. 266-272.

¹²"Terms of the Atlantic Pact," in *The Congressional Digest*, vol. 28, p. 99.

This represents the legalistic aspect of the matter, and it is evident that consistent disregard for these obligations could destroy much or all of their legal value; however, while notable violations of civil and political rights have taken place since the end of the second world war, no violation of a state's legal existence has occurred. While the matter can hardly be said to be satisfactorily settled, it is evident that a legal advance has been made, and that we are in process of transition toward a broader legal concept of the right of state existence.

Book Reviews

Edited by H. MALCOLM MACDONALD

A. Rossi: *A Communist Party In Action*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, Pp., 301, \$4.00.)

That it could possibly "happen here," no one would have conceded up to the time of Communism's taking over of Czechoslovakia. When "it happened" to this country, whose people are like our own in so many respects,—their western orientation, their sturdy independence of spirit and corresponding belief in hard work as a way to success; and whose society, like our own, was the very antithesis of aristocratic and caste-bound, then Americans knew the grim truth: it "could happen" here. Communism, Moscow-engineered, could take over, even here, its conquest accomplished from within.

In Rossi's treatise, published originally in 1948 in France under the title *Physiologie du Parti Communiste Francais*, we are given a blueprint of the manner in which the conquest might be effected. The case is that of France, again a country with ideals similar to our own. It did not, as in Czechoslovakia, "quite happen," but so nearly as to furnish a perfect chart of Communist procedure and technique.

There is within every class in every nation a certain discontent and a yearning for something forever beyond the reach. Discontent is universal, and it is the Communist's first task, as he seeks to win converts, to probe the source of discontent in a given case and lay bare the object of yearning. In France the dearest object of desire among the class which at one time the Communists sought to seduce,—the tough and highly individualistic peasantry, was land. Communism, the appeal went out, would give full control of the land into peasant hands. Had not this happened in the Soviet Union? There, the peasants were assured, "the government has not so much as touched the land of the poorer peasants." There was no reference to mass expropriation and deportation, only the utopian ideal of land ownership, and so for a time conversion proceeded apace.

In France there were two other yearnings, simultaneously exploited: on the one hand the desperate passion for peace present in every class, and on the other the no less desperate passion for the principles of the Great Revolution to be found in the urban proletariat and among the peasants. The Communists played up the Soviet Union as the great foe of war and the great symbol of the Revolution, organizing demonstrations on national Independence Day (July 14th) and taking over the *Marseillaise* as the new Communist hymn.

There is nothing in Rossi's expose which we do not know or have not experienced ourselves in dealing with the Communists in our own country, whether it be their technique of the big lie, their distortion of the national myth so that it seems to argue for Communism, or their corruption and prostitution of the fine slogans Liberalism, Democracy, Progressivism, and Socialism. We have seen the beginnings of what happened in France in our own minorities, a few of which have already succumbed to Communist seduction, believing that in the Communist utopia all things will be added unto them. We know before Rossi tells us that the Communist is a militant, thoroughly disciplined and trained fanatic. Yet the study we have here is valuable none the less, as Conrad Heiden's study of Fascist technique in *Der Führer* was valuable, for its sheer, cold documentation of the manner in which a nation can betray itself, through abandoning intelligence for the glib and all-embracing promise.

The book is well printed and generously supplied with notes and an introduction by the translator, Willmoore Kendall. It has a good index. Yale deserves our thanks.

University of Texas

A. P. Coleman

KARL PRIBRAM: *Conflicting Patterns of Thought*. (Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1949, Pp., 176, \$3.75.)

The popular statement that social problems loom so large because other people "think differently" than we do, comes under examination in Dr. Karl Pribram's latest book, *Patterns of Thought*.

In his treatise he analyzes the logical background of four leading contemporary socio-political philosophies—universalism, nominalism, intuitionism and dialecticism—and outlines the consequences which these patterns of thought or methods of thinking, have for specific economic, social, and political institutions.

Contending that the methods of universalistic reasoning emphasizing eternal immutable truths (as in religion), nominalistic reasoning stressing the individual, intuitionist (organismic) reasoning featuring the nation and nationality, and the dialectic pattern highlighting social classes, "have been responsible for far-reaching divergencies in political and social institutions", Dr. Pribram sees the contemporary products or results of these methods of thought in the church, western democracy, pre-war Germany and Italy, and Russia respectively.

For Dr. Pribram all of these patterns except nominalism, premised as they are on the identity of thinking and being, ie.,—"that the mind is capable of arriving directly at insight into the order of the universe", are unacceptable. Only nominalism which repudiates the belief that the

human mind is capable of arriving directly into the real nature and phenomena of the universe and holds all concepts to be "purely hypothetical and to be based on assumptions," provides a sound and workable method in solving the basic social problems such as social responsibility, individual liberty, economic planning, international trade and lasting peace.

Dr. Prbram's analysis, while novel and interesting is fraught with some important difficulties. For instance his use of the term "patterns of thought" is not always clear. While generally used as synonymous with method of thought in a procedural or means sense, it is also used with a substantive connotation. One cannot help but suspect that this difficulty is more than technical and internal and represents the inability, or at least unwillingness, of the author to distinguish between means and end or procedure and substance.

While perhaps a result of his obvious effort to simplify his thesis, a difficulty of another sort is encountered by the author in attempting to show that specific "patterns of thought" are responsible for the different institutions in existence in the world today. The history of political thinking demonstrates that diverse philosophical systems may or may not result in diverse conclusions. As a matter of fact the fluidity and ingenuity of political thinking is more apt to justify the conclusion that any given political philosophy, if managed properly, can explain or justify, not just one, but many ends.

These difficulties notwithstanding, Dr. Pribram has written a significant book. His emphasis upon methods of thinking is a refreshing note in the long and persistent emphasis which social scientists have placed upon substantive matters in their consideration of social problems. Concise, clearly written, and provocative, Dr. Pribram's book is of great interest to those social scientists methodologically inclined and concerned with the philosophical and integrative aspects of social problems.

University of Oklahoma

Don L. Bowen

STUART A. MACCORKLE, and DICK SMITH: *Texas Government*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949, Pp., viii, 587. \$3.75.)

This volume represents an attempt to put into book form that part of the general survey course in American government which, in Texas institutions, deals with Texas government. Like two earlier volumes on the same subject, currently available in recent editions, this one also is aimed in part at informing interested citizens regarding their government. The effort has been made to make the book interesting to such readers by avoiding a great mass of detail. It is perhaps indicative of some interest on the part of Texas citizens that there should be three such books available, when in many other states, no comparable volume exists. Some

states never have had any careful analysis of their governmental organization and procedures.

Of the 587 pages in this volume, 409 are devoted to the text proper, the next thirteen to appendix material, ninety-one to the text of the Texas Constitution, fifty-seven to the index of the state constitution, and the concluding seventeen pages to the index to the text. One may well question the necessity for devoting 148 pages to the text of the state constitution and the index to it; in almost any state, a student or a citizen who was interested enough in the subject to buy a book such as this would be able to obtain a copy of the constitution from official sources in pamphlet form. The space so consumed could have been used to much better advantage in giving some consideration to important aspects of the state program altogether omitted from this volume.

The seventeen chapters of the book, each with a brief selected bibliography, cover the constitution, political parties and the suffrage, three on the legislative process, four on the governor and the administrative structure (but with no mention of personnel), two on revenue and expenditures, three on administrative services (education, welfare, and labor), one each on the judiciary, county government, municipal government, and intergovernmental relations. With the inclusion of these subjects, there can be no quarrel, but one is disappointed to find practically no mention of other equally important administrative services such as agriculture, conservation, highways, health, and utility regulation,—to mention only a few.

The coverage of subject matter is brief, yet clear and to the point. In dealing with the legislature, for instance, one chapter is devoted to structure, organization and powers, the second to the actual passage of bills, and the third to improvements in structure and procedure. The remedies suggested in the latter include, with special reference to the Texas situation, such generally accepted proposals as joint committees, reduction in the number of committees, schedule of committee meetings, public hearings, publicity to committee proceedings, better bill drafting, the printing of all bills, time limit on the introduction of bills, limiting the number of special and local laws, higher salaries for members, merit system for legislative employees, development of legislative aids, and annual sessions.

Similar treatment is accorded other important aspects of the Texas government with which the volume deals. Among students of government and administration in the American states, there is an acute need for reliable descriptive and analytical material on individual states, suitable for comparative purposes. Such students will be grateful for this study of

the government of Texas by two competent scholars long familiar with the organization and functioning of the government of their state.

Legislative Reference Service,

Library of Congress

W. Brooke Graves

JEROME FRANK: *Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949, Pp., 441, \$5.00.)

Courts on Trial is a continuation and expansion of Judge Frank's approach to contemporary legal problems as first laid down in his *Law and the Modern Mind* published in 1930. Basically, it is an attack on mysticism in the law and upon the practitioners of "legal magic" who have enshrouded their art in a fog of technical pragon and romantic concepts relating to the predictability and certainty of legal decisions.

Many popular shibboleths are dissipated by the author's analysis of "court house justice." He shows that the alleged certainty of law and the predictability of decisions in trial courts are mere myths. This is due, not only to the difficulty of establishing the certainty of the legal rules to be applied, but more significantly to the impossibility of predicting the testimony of witnesses once they are on the stand or the effect such testimony will have upon the presiding judge and the "twelve tried men and true."

The psychology of the modern trial, based upon the "fight theory," comes in for caustic criticism as also does the jury system which Judge Frank like to see abolished in all but major criminal cases. It is interesting to note in this connection that England, the home of the jury trial, has already abandoned it in most civil and some criminal cases and has abolished the use of the Grand Jury in all but a single technical and unimportant instance. In the United States, however, the jury trial still flourishes as "the palladium of our liberties" although a trend against its retention is becoming marked.

Stressing the importance of the Trial Court v the Appellate Court, for it is in the Trial Court that the *facts* are established, Judge Frank urges a revision of assumptions and procedures in that area. He advocates first public education on, and professional recognition of, the vital role of the trial court and then adds such specific recommendations as special training for Trial Judges, Lawyers and Jurors, all with a view towards obtaining a fairer and more just decision in the original courts.

Whether or not one agrees with Judge Frank's approach, there is no doubt that *Courts on Trial* will stir up controversy in legal and professional circles for many years to come. It offends too deeply against many of our smugly cherished illusions concerning the nature of the jud-

icial process to be allowed to go unchallenged even by the layman. This is all to the good, for out of such controversy may come a more realistic evaluation of our courts. After all, this is what I suppose Judge Frank to have in mind, for beneath his ruthless criticism lies a substrata of sincere belief in the need for a better approximation of justice and right in our trial procedures and verdicts. *Courts on Trial* is therefore a healthy challenge to the complacent Judge, Lawyer, and Citizen to cease deluding themselves with the opiate that all is well in this best of all possible worlds and to do something about bringing our court procedures into closer conformity with empirical facts.

On the side of "minutiae" the book suffers from inadequate footnoting, a defect which is often distracting to the reader. The work is likewise on occasions discursive and repetitious—the latter perhaps being intentional in light of the author's story in his Preface concerning Mr. Schnickelfritz of Denver. But even these defects, which sometimes make the reader wish that Judge Frank had sat down and done a thorough revision and condensation of his book before publication, cannot obscure the persuasive and logical arguments of the author. *Courts on Trial* is a worthy successor to *Law and the Modern Mind* and indubitably will be as influential in the years to come.

University of Texas

H. Malcolm Macdonald

ELIZABETH HEAD VAUGHN: *Community Under Stress: An Internment Camp Culture*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949, Pp., 160, \$2.50.)

Community Under Stress is one of several sociological documents that has appeared as a result of the experiences of social scientists during World War II. It is a study of a Japanese concentration camp on the Philippine Islands in which the author, a prisoner of war, played the role of "an involuntary participant observer." Mrs. Vaughn and her two children were interned in Santo Thomas along with some four thousand other civilians of thirteen nationalities from March 10, 1943 to February 3, 1945. They had previously surrendered to the Japanese on June 7, 1942, after several months of hiding with Negritos in the mountains; they were held for approximately nine months in the major seaport town of the Island, Bacolod City.

Questions raised by the author to control the selection of materials for understanding the social dynamics of a *Community Under Stress* contain fruitful hypotheses (not made explicit in the study) which, if adequately examined, will shed considerable light upon human relations. These questions were centered around the following problems: the ability of "civilized" man to survive in an internment camp environment; the basis of

leadership in a crisis situation when role and status have been sharply modified; the equalization of property and supporting ideologies within a group suffering disaster; the nature of the acculturation process of a heterogenous group; the effects of the loss of privacy upon the individual and the group; and, differences between men, women and children in their abilities to adjust to the conditions of an internment camp.

In addition to the testing of the above hypotheses the book includes some pertinent historical materials on the "Social and Economic Structure of the Philippines at the Outbreak of War," an outline of international laws governing wartime imprisonment, and a culture description of Bacolod camp organization.

Employing A. H. Leighton's scheme [The Governing of Men] Mrs. Vaughn makes some sketchy, categorical and conclusive statements presumably on the basis of her data. Some of these statements are platitudinous and do not transcend the obvious. Her conclusions on "acute suffering," "ridicule will bring almost anyone to terms," "physical discomfort," "culturally determined anxieties concerning the future," etc., in the opinion of the reviewer, are trite statements and add little or nothing to what is already known about human conduct.

This is not to say that the volume is not an important one. On the contrary it is a valuable social science document in that it gives one a close-up view of human relations under stress; it further shows that the limits of human behavior are infinite, and that culture furnishes only the content of human conduct; it is not the determining mechanism. However, this is nothing new in social science theory or methodology.

One final negative note revolves around the subjective bias of the book which the author readily admits. While this reviewer would agree with Mrs. Vaughn's position that no analysis of a social situation is wholly objective, dispassionate and without bias, yet it is necessary for any scientific investigator to examine his or her subjective biases and make them explicit, less they get "bootlegged" into the analysis.

Atlanta University

Mozell C. Hill

DOMENICO GAGLIARDO: *American Social Insurance.* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949, Pp., 671, \$5.00.)

The author describes comprehensively and in detail the social insurance movements in America. A summary of each program, both private and public is made under the following headings: Public Assistance, Federal Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance, Railroad Retirement, Federal Civil Service Retirement Act, Unemployment Compensation, Railroad Unemployment Insurance, Workmen's Compensation and Federal Health

Insurance Plans. Finally, the author discusses private systems of Health Insurance. Although not social insurance, and by no means adequate, voluntary prepaid hospital service and medical plans, both nonprofit and commercial, are answering a social need. The one that has gained the most ground is the Blue Cross System.

These systems play a big part in meeting the needs of certain groups; however, they have not and probably will never reach the groups who need most this protection. Because of the increased cost of medical and hospital services, full coverage is not provided without excessive premiums.

Except under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, there is no Federal plan to provide cash benefits during illness. Some states, however, provide such benefits through their unemployment compensation laws. Those noted are Rhode Island, California, and New Jersey.

Mr. Gagiardo concludes that social insurance in the United States is in its infancy; the movements as above summarized came slowly and in jerks. It is not uniform, since some 50 different political units legislate independently. Diversity also exists as to coverage and benefits between different Federal retirement systems.

The issue now before the American people is *what should be done about Social Insurance and public assistance programs?* There are two courses of action: (1) develop the Social insurance program; and (2) abolish all existing social insurance measures and substitute a universal relief program with a means test. The Social Security Administration and the Senate Finance Committee's Advisory Council on Social Security recommend the first course. This would mean closing the benefit and coverage gaps in the present schemes.

As for himself, the author thinks a much improved combination of insurance and relief is the most desirable. There appears to be a trend in that direction and in his opinion an irresistible one.

Federal Security Agency, Ft. Worth

Z. E. Avery

ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON: *Free Government in the Making* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, Pp., 846. \$6.00.)

Mr. Mason, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University, has already established himself as a competent scholar by his definitive and excellent books on Justice Brandeis. He has now turned his attention to the meaning and significance of the American political tradition. *Free Government in the Making* is a book of readings in American political thought which, as the author states in the foreword, "features the ideas and words of the men" who made and shaped our demo-

cratic institutions. The book is designed to serve as a textbook for courses in American political theory—a textbook which successfully accomplishes the aim of the author: "to confront the student with living issues, exhibit our best minds in action—opposing, discussing, deliberating, compromising, deciding, building institutions of government."

The readings are organized into twenty-one sections with an introductory note by the author at the head of each chapter. These introductory essays are, as Mr. Mason states, "designed to set the stage, introduce the actors and acquaint the student with essential facts." The essays go beyond the stated aims and actually serve as critical analyses and summaries of the political thought of the period. Taken in their entirety—some 130 pages—the notes may be said to constitute a textbook supplementing the readings. At the end of each chapter a selected bibliography covering the political thought and problems of the period serves as an excellent reference for students interested in more intensive study.

The first chapter of the book deals with old world foundations and appropriately begins with excerpts from debates which were held in the General Council of the Parliamentary Army at Putney in 1647. In the same chapter are selections from the writings of those English philosophers, Locke, Harrington, and Montesquieu, whose ideas influenced the thinking of American statesmen of the Revolutionary period. The following chapters deal with the development of American political thought from the colonial period to the establishment of the government under the Constitution. Excerpts are given from the writings of such men as John Winthrop, Roger Williams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and Richard H. Lee. This symposium continues chronologically through the Roosevelt administrations with the last chapter entitled "Free Government Vindicated". The final section deals with the present day dilemma of liberalism and very appropriately closes with Justice Duglas' Freedom Train address, published here for the first time.

Although not nearly as comprehensive or monumental a book as Louis M. Hacker's, *The Shaping of the American Tradition*, Mr. Mason's book does meet the need for a competent and usable textbook in the field of American political theory.

The University of Oklahoma

Rufus G. Hall, Jr.

REUBEN HILL: *Families Under Stress*. (New York: Harper Bros., 1949, Pp. 443, \$4.50.)

Dr. Reuben Hill states the objectives of "Families Under Stress" as follows:

"1. To sample family adjustment in general by the study of adjustment to two crises: war separation and reunion.

2. To test the findings of other studies of the family in crisis in a new context.

3. To record the variety of modes of adjustment to a heretofore unstudied set of family crises.

4. To discover the types of family organization and processes of adjustment which make families most invulnerable/vulnerable to separation/reunion crises."

To quote further "If there is any ingenuity in the design of this study, it is that we have identified an external threat common to every family as a basis for comparing reactions."

The material is presented in four divisions or parts, with a total of ten chapters.

Part four has but one chapter—a very interesting and challenging chapter entitled "Implications for National and Local Policy." To quote: "The day of taking the American family for granted is drawing to a close. The critical situation in family life today cannot be denied. The evidence is apparent everywhere. We have added to it within the covers of this book. - - - A national policy which deals with American families as a precious national resource in social organization appears forthcoming. It will receive the support of the findings of this study and the approval of the great majority of families rearing children today."

In the main body of his study, Dr. Hill says: "Two tasks were clear: We wished to test the findings of other studies in a new context, and we wished to delve adequately into the new context itself, namely the crisis of war separation and reunion. The one task was definitive and the second explorative. For the first task fairly precise questionnaires using as often as possible standardized scales and inventories were indicated. A statistical analysis of those materials would be feasible. For the second task a prolonged interview with open-end questions seemed important if we were to record the variety and depth of human experience with the as-yet-unstudied separation and reunion crises. Questionnaires were built and a detailed interviewer's schedule constructed, submitted to experts in the field for criticism and revision - - -" In evaluating the combined use of the statistical and the case study methods the author concludes: "The analysis of the fifty-two deviant families, ten of which have been presented here, has been rewarding. We can conclude that the method is worthy of continued exploration. This is indeed an area in which the case study and the statistical method can be teamed profitably. - - - One of the unique features of this study is to bring them to

gether to compare results from statistical scales with results from configurational judgments."

Perhaps the chief limitation of the study is the relatively small number of families used in the study, and the author recognizes this defect. He says though, that " - - - we have attempted to control some of the individual differences between families by selecting 135 families for the study, all of whom are Iowa residents, of unbroken homes, containing at least one child over four years of age; all of whom have also experienced the crisis of wartime separation, and most of whom have also experienced the critical adjustments of reunion."

All teachers and students of the family will want to use *Families Under Stress*. The book makes two especially outstanding contributions to our study of the family:

1. It shows in an excellent way how the family in the United States met the crises of separation and reunion, resulting from the War.
2. It presents a method of study which is exceedingly valuable not alone for this particular research, but as a method for future study of the family.

Trinity University

Charles N. Burrows

MARION W. SMITH: *Indians of the Urban Northwest*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, Pp., 370. \$6.00.)

This is the first comprehensive survey of a Northwestern Indian culture. The survey is a worthy contribution and is a symposium whose contributors present an analysis of socio-anthropological research on the Indians of the urban Northwest. The book is unique in that here gathered together in one volume for the first time, is material covering all the major anthropological aspects of a single group of people. The study was made of Salish Indians of the coastal regions of the Northwest from Portland to Vancouver. This great area of the Northwest coast is the home of the Salish Indians who developed a spectacular culture which is quite different to any other of the North American continent.

Although the impact of white man's civilization has greatly modified the Salish Indian's culture, Indians still live who met the first white man who came to their villages. Therefore, many of the phases of their early culture pattern are reenacted in the daily roles of the people.

This research deals intensively and specifically with the impact of modern society on the "Coast Salish" Indians. Their diet, a chemical and a vitamin analysis of food habits, and a wide range of religious beliefs from personal supernatural powers to Christian faith are considered.

One entire chapter is devoted to an indigenous example of the fusion of old and new beliefs known to the Salish as the Shaker religion. The book also gives a vivid account of culture and personality, social organization, physical anthropology, archaeology, linguistics, mythology, music, art, basketry, childhood, family relations, and many other interesting aspects of the Indian's life in the urban Northwest.

An important feature of the book is the personal narrative of a Coast Salish Indian named John Farnsby, who was the most famous Shaman of his time. During the ninety-two years of his life, he witnessed the cultural transition from pre-European society to the complicated life of the present. Farnsby's reminiscences represent ethnographic data of the Northwest Indians. It adds a personal realistic touch to the research which permits an insight into the religious, social, economic, and political characteristics of his people.

Although the book reveals much technical information, it will hold the interest of the layman, and will be of special interest and usefulness to all social scientists.

S.F.A. State College

Floyd A. Pollock

BENSON Y. LANDIS: *Rural Welfare Services*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, Pp., viii, 201, \$3.00.)

Rural sociologists and all of those concerned in rural social work will be very much interested in this book by Dr. Landis, because there is at the present time such a dearth of material on rural social welfare programs. The reader will find little new in the way of programs in the report, but he will be given a good understanding of how our many national, state, and in some instances local services fit into serving people in rural as well as urban areas. Not always have rural people gotten their share of the services that are supposed to be available to them.

The chapter on rural trends and needs will be enlightening to those not familiar with our rural scene. More needs actually exist in the rural areas than in the urban areas because of poor housing, low annual income, poor schools, large numbers of dependent children and aged, although the services to meet these needs in rural areas are in most all instances inferior to those in the urban areas.

The discussion of rural opinions regarding social services is most interesting. Rural opinion towards social work and social workers is generally very unfavorable ranging from "amused intolerance to real antagonism". The paradox is however, that rural people have always been sympathetic towards families that have lost their breadwinner by illness or death. Although they are against bureaucracy they have asked each

Congress for government support programs and have joined in with government bureaus in huge soil conservation projects.

Antecedents to present rural social services are similar to those in the city such as the alms houses, paupers pensions, widows pensions and etc. Some rural communities have for many years even had rural health nurses, Y.M.C.A. secretaries, etc.

The big impetus to rural social welfare came with the new deal administration in the '30's with the PWA, CCC, FERA, etc., programs culminating in the final establishment of the social security act promoting such programs as old age and survivors insurance, aid to dependent children, child welfare services, maternal and child health, aid to crippled children, aid to the needy blind. All of these programs were meant for rural people as well as urban people, but often did not function as effectively in the rural areas as in the urban areas with perhaps an exception of the old age pension program.

Other national programs serving rural people are the American Red Cross, Farmers Home Administration, National Recreation Association, Boy and Girl Scouts of America, the YMCA and YWCA, the Agricultural Extension Service, the Smith-Hughes vocational agriculture program, the Farm Grange, Farmers Union, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Child Labor Committee, the employment services, the unemployment compensation commission, state and national probation service, state and national health programs, the Blue Cross System, and others. In some areas, local organizations from the churches, lodges and mutual aid societies have been of real value in social welfare as well as unorganized, neighborly help.

There is need for trained social welfare workers in rural areas, but it will perhaps be sometime before these areas have the benefit of people who are graduates of graduate schools of social work. More attention, Dr. Landis thinks, should be given to undergraduate training of those who will likely go into social work in the rural areas. Special attention should be given to youth programs because more of the youth of the nation are in the rural areas and fewer of the youth services. More attention should be given to consideration of the proper unit in which to work in the rural areas. The county, the unit now most often used, is not always the best administrative unit. Sometimes the most desirable unit would be a part of a county, other times parts of several counties or a combination of two or more counties in some programs in the sparsely settled areas.

In concluding, Dr. Landis recommends for the future the following program: (1) federal grants for social services to be made on a variable basis; (2) federal participation in general assistance (five states, among

which is Texas, now have no general assistance program.); (3) extend old age and survivors insurance to rural people; (4) a national responsibility to complete a system of general hospital and rural health centers; (5) larger units of social welfare administration; (6) public health facilities to all the people; (7) public health nursing for rural people; (8) a longtime program of special grants to aid rural social services; (9) expand voluntary youth agencies services; (10) equalize school opportunities; (11) cooperation of religious bodies in welfare services; (12) improve the lot of migrant laborers and their families; (13) interest rural leaders on a national level in these services; (14) improve rural recreation; (15) have citizens committees composed of both rural and urban people to work for social legislation for rural people; (16) improve rural social welfare services through the cooperation of all agencies and institutions.

Texas A&M College

Daniel Russell

BERNARD BERELSON: *The Library's Public: A Report of the Public Library Inquiry*. (New York :Columbia University Press, 1949, Pp., xx, 174, \$3.00.)

Among the first publications from the Public Library Inquiry, the Berelson report is a review and synthesis of all data on library book use and users in the United States published in studies since 1930, including those from the 1947 national sample survey of library use conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. In addition to presenting thus all that is now "known" about public library service of the last twenty years, the report indicates the need for continued and more systematic investigation of problems in four major areas and concludes with a chapter on implications for public library policy. Pointing up the limitations and tentative character of the research analyzed, Dean Berelson urges both a more favorable intellectual climate in librarianship and emphasis on the significance of problems rather than their quantification or form. For those who hold librarianship or the public library movement among their major concerns the *Library's Public* is first reading.

Probably most disputable of the implications for library policy is that which proposes a clear redefinition of the library's service and a ranking in a value hierarchy of its actual and potential users or publics. To contribute effectively to the growth and enrichment of our cultural climate ("And that is its proper task."), the library may have to devote itself to "serious" communication needs rather than attempt to serve the total community. By leaving popular recreation and entertainment to newspapers, magazines, films, and radio—that is, to the commercial media (rental libraries included) which are already effectively competing with the library—it might better serve the smaller group that would con-

tinue to use its facilities, and thereby best promote the interests of the community. It remains to be seen whether the Library Inquiry as a whole will verify or disprove this hypothesis as to the modern function of America's public libraries.

University of Texas

E.J. Humeston, Jr.

HANS KOHN: *The Twentieth Century*. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949, Pp., 242, \$2.00.)

PETER VIERECK: *Conservatism Revisited*. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949, Pp., 187, \$2.50.)

Two recently published works, Hans Kohn's *The Twentieth Century: A Mid-way Account of the Western World*, and Peter Viereck's *Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt Against Revolt*, deserve the attention of teachers of political and social science as well as that of the thoughtful lay reader. Professor Kohn's book is written in his usual challenging and clear style. Its sub-title, however, is somewhat deceptive. The work is not primarily concerned with the contributions and achievements of the first half of the current century, but rather with an analysis of those movements and forces of the Nineteenth Century which help to explain the developments of the Twentieth. Basically, the book is therefore a background work and it is not until the concluding chapters that the author turns whole heartedly to the problems of the present. It is a most useful work for laying the foundations for modern problems and is invaluable as a preliminary reading assignment in a course in Twentieth Century political ideas. Especially valuable is Professor Kohn's discussion of the cultural and political heritage of Russia. The book ends on a happy note. The author sees the continuing threat of Russian Communism as an ultimate guarantee of western democratic solidarity and cooperation. Unlike the post World War I years, when the allies fell apart because of a lack of any external threat to keep them united, the situation today permits no such luxury. In view of this, Professor Kohn is optimistic in regard to the possibilities of a long range western cooperation which will assure the ultimate victory of the freedom-loving nations.

Professor Viereck's work is a sturdy defense of the principles and policies of Conservatism. It is an appeal to thinking persons to revisit the realm of conservative thought and again to apprehend its fundamental thesis. The conservatism which Professor Viereck defends is not to be associated with reaction nor with "standpatism." Rather, it is the conservatism of a Burke or a Metternich, a conservatism which seeks progress in terms of the rationally possible. It is a theory of statecraft which puts a high premium on intelligence and moderation and is not forgetful of the value of tradition and custom in the maintenance of domestic and

international peace. In the end Viereck's Conservative sounds like the sort of person every good Liberal thinks himself to be, or hopes he will become. The bulk of the book is taken up with an interpretation of Prince Metternich, his philosophy and his politics. From this analysis, based largely on Srbik's Biography plus other Metternich papers which have become available since 1920, the Austrian statesman emerges in a more favorable light than that accorded him by previous historians. Professor Viereck attempts to show by his analysis of Metternich that there are certain conservative values which are still significant in the solution of present problems. The work is a useful antidote for the more starry eyed liberalism of certain of our contemporary writers and deserves careful attention by those seeking to resolve the difficulties of our contemporary world.

The University of Texas

H. Malcolm Macdonald

Department of the Army: *Scientists in Uniform—World War II*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. Pp. ix + 98. n. p.).

Writing now with clear recollection of almost four years in Army classification and assignment duty, I note: at long last—a critical summary on service use of scientific skills! The report, unfortunately gives little illumination for questions on what happened to social scientists. Only the marginal areas of geography and psychology were directly surveyed. But what this report says and what can be recalled do make for fair assumptions and for strong convictions about social scientists in uniform.

This is no brasshat whitewash job! Assuming that "scientists" comprised less than 2% of the Armed Forces during war years, the authors grant that military dependency upon and needs for this group were vast. They show wide disparity in military assignments utilizing professional skills: 54.6% (1,546) of the biologists who were questioned reported poor or no use of skills; only 14.9% (163) of the psychologists fell in these groups. Efficient use—and ponder over these figures—was clearly related to type of induction. Taking the poor and no use assignments by induction classes: draft, enlistment, reserve, direct commission, the percentages were: 48.1, 44.2, 35.7, 22.7. Eighty-one percent of the total reporting group (15,157) recommended improved technical assignment practices and improved supervision of technical functions. The weight of evidence led the authors to a first conclusion: *The absence of special selective service procedures for scientists prevented realistic procurement of the kinds and types of these individuals required by the Armed Services.*

The upshot of this study is clear: the Armed Services cannot be expected to plan alone for utilization of scientific skills. Help is needed

from civilian professional associations. The American Psychological Association had leadership before and throughout the last war which was well aware of this. Psychologists were upon entry to military service—to use an easily translatable GI term, "rarebirds" subject to special assignment; economists, most historians and political scientists, people with doctorates in philosophy, and sociologists—well, they were "rawmeat". Yet, almost throughout the war the Army needed these very skills. "Dragnet" circulars always had a way of arriving after assignments—usually almost unrevokable—were made. And, the Army had greater needs than were ever realized! How could the Army brass with a war as well as mobilization and replacement demands on their hands be expected to know, for example, that civilian "sociologists" could be screened for at least company grade material for disciplinary barracks or internment overhead, for opinion pollsters, occupation force, classification and many other pre-trained specialists?

The men who now run most of our social science professional associations are of the generation between the wars. They have no background in experience for determination of how the skilled groups they serve might contribute professional ability in wartime. Indeed, if they care, there are postwar interest, far afield, which are demanding enough. But, I suggest that those of us in economics, government, history, philosophy, and sociology who did wear uniforms in 1917-18 or 1941-46 might profitably spend two hours with *Scientists in Uniform*. They might even rise therefrom to do a little "soundin'-off" in the interest of their nation, their guilds, their professional successors, or just themselves! John Donne's bell still tolls!

Oklahoma A&M College

Paul B. Foreman

WAYNE GARD: *Frontier Justice*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949, Pp. 324, \$3.75.)

Wayne Gard, who some years ago gave us the interesting *Sam Bass*, has now written another fine book, *Frontier Justice*, "an informal study of the rise of law and order west of Mississippi." The work covers the period from approximately 1836 to around the close of the century.

The book is divided into four parts. The first of these deals with Tomahawk justice (vengeance) and the feuds among the whites. Even after the Indians were pacified, or annihilated, it took many years for the whites to secure peace among themselves. Where state law was non-existent, or at best poorly enforced, some men felt it necessary to seek justice of a sort by repaying wrongs in kind. In this way vengeful feuds were started, not from any desire to kill for the sake of killing, but to remedy conditions which the participants considered as intolerable and

for which there was no available remedy at law. Vengeance begat counter vengeance until a vicious vendetta resulted. Usually the violence subsided when effective law enforcement caught up with the frontier. Mr. Gard thinks that the readiness of the pioneers to settle their own disputes may have been a deterrent to crime.

Range wars between cattle ranchers and sheepmen and the disturbances over the enclosure of the vast grass lands by barbed wire were primarily expressions of economic rivalry. The fence cutters war was, at least in its earlier stages, an effort to seek justice through group violence.

Probably the most interesting section of the book deals with the Vigilantes, especially in the mining camps of the Far West. In communities where there were no formal courts and no jails the settlers administered swift and decisive justice through improvised Vigilante committees and people's courts. These were a marked advance over the feuds and range wars of many frontier settlements. Mr. Gard considers them as "spontaneous expressions of the American spirit of democracy." In this connection he says:

They showed that men in isolated communities could cope with a difficult social problem without awaiting formal action from the outside. Their activities contrasted sharply with the lynching bees of the South. The latter usually represented a deliberate flouting of statutory laws and of elected officials who—except in some instances in the Reconstruction Period—were able and ready to handle the situation. The informal actions in the West, on the other hand, were not a mockery of law, because there was no effective law. They were the only alternative to anarchy in places where statutory law did not prevail. They were the forerunners of the established courts. (p. 176)

The last section of the book deals with early day law enforcement officers and judges. The pioneer sheriffs and marshalls risked their lives to make the west safe. Only through them could the emerging courts function properly. Even though these early courts were often presided over by a Roy Bean, through the work of men like Judge Parker of the Ft. Smith (Arkansas) district, orderly and fearless enforcement of statutory law was brought to the frontier. Feuds, range wars and Vigilante activities gave way to more orderly legal processes.

Of necessity the author relies heavily on secondary sources, but his own research is also quite evident. Mr. Gard, the Texas State Historical Association (who made available a Rockefeller Foundation research grant) and the University of Oklahoma press, the publishers, are all to be congratulated on this interesting and well written book.

Tarleton State College

Dick Smith

GEORGE WYTHE: *Industry in Latin America* (Second Edition). (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, Pp., 387, \$5.00.)

This is the second edition of an excellent factual study which was originally published in 1945.

The book is divided into three parts: Background and Problems, the Twenty Republics, and Today and Tomorrow.

Background and Problems concerns itself with the overall nature of the industrialization problem in Latin America, dealing first with the possibility that the development of industry will make it possible to raise the standard of living. However, industrialization in the region has not as yet gone far, perhaps not as far as it had gone in the United States in the 1870's. Nevertheless the textile industry, food processing, and the reduction of minerals prior to export are all activities of considerable importance. Dr. Wythe says:

A brief analysis of the leading industrial groups in Latin America, indeed, indicates how the larger countries are approaching an intermediate stage of industrial evolution. None can be said to have attained to an appreciable degree the marked characteristics of the mature industrial countries: highly developed machine and metal-working industries; production of heavy chemicals; industrial research laboratories; capacity for developing and applying inventions; application of scientific management to plans; and the general use of automatic machinery. Most of the Latin American developments have been in the light industries, but a beginning has been made in the heavy and machine industries. Some attention has been given, especially by branches of foreign firms, to plant layout and to the perfection of manual operations, but excessive protection and the smallness of the markets have retarded the general application of scientific principles. As to the use of automatic machinery, the wage scale in some countries is so low as to act as a deterrent. Until recently, there was little inducement, for instance, to install automatic machines in textile factories or packaging and wrapping machines in the foodstuffs, pharmaceutical, and toilet-goods industries.

Though Latin America shows a tendency toward concentration of production in larger and better-equipped factories, numerous small plants and workshops still carry the burden of industry. Handicrafts and the custom shop are much more important than in the United States and are likely to retain their hold for an indefinite period.

Succeeding chapters discuss the availability of raw materials for the developing industries in Latin America, the problem of capital accumulation, and where competent business men may come from. It would seem that one of the long run difficulties will not be the lack of ability to acquire technical skill on the part of Latin American workers. They come to perform very well in such a capacity. However, the limitations of the market pose something more of a problem. Large mass purchasing power develops slowly. And Latin America as yet has not developed it. The concluding chapter in the first part of the book discusses the measures which various Latin American countries are taking to encourage industrialization, protective tariffs, government sponsored development corporations, government sponsored long-term financing institutions, and so on.

Part Two is a country by country description of the actual industrialization which has occurred. Corporations are identified; and changes in the identity of the items being produced are enumerated. In addition in connection with each country there is discussion of the positive measures which the government is taking to encourage industrialization.

Part Three is a general reappraisal of the prospects for industrialization in Latin America in which the author comes to the conclusion that: "Under the economic and technological circumstances of the modern world, the number of nations which can develop manufacturing industries to advantage has increased considerably . . . A few regions are on the threshold of a very considerable industrialization, while others may be passed by entirely."

Dr. Wythe's book is primarily a compilation of factual information on the extent of industrialization in Latin America, and it should be judged as such. A very considerable study of the factual basis for industrialization and of the manner in which the development is going on is necessary as a prelude to arriving at really significant value judgments with regard to the process. In this sense it is a useful book. It is not a revolutionary book in the realm of policy making. But it is a well organized compilation of significant data.

University of Texas

Wendell Gordon

Patriarcha, or the Natural Powers of the Kings of England Asserted and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer. Edited by Peter Laslett. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949, Pp., 326. 12s. 6d.)

As Laslett remarks in his introduction, "for over two hundred years the name of Sir Robert Filmer has been a byword—a byword for obscurity. None, or almost none, of the thinkers or historians who have examined Filmerism, refuted it, anatomized it or simply dismissed it as stupidity have known exactly who Sir Robert Filmer was, when he lived, what he did, and what he wrote."

It has been Mr. Laslett's task in this, the seventh in the series of Blackwell's Political Texts, to lift the veil of obscurity, to place Filmer in his proper political context, and to correct the inaccuracies and misconceptions found in the few texts on political theory in which Filmer is even mentioned. It is difficult indeed to envision a more careful, a more skilled, and a more enlightened work than that which Laslett has accomplished.

Aided by the discovery of the only surviving handwritten version of *Patriarcha*, found by the editor in 1929, Mr. Laslett has not only given us the first accurate presentation of Filmer's main opus, but also includes, within the confines of this thin volume, Filmer's analyses of the political

theories of Aristotle, Hobbes' *Leviathan*, Milton's *Against Salmasius*, and Grotius' *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, as well as sundry observations on "The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy" and "The Necessity of the Absolute Power of All Kings".

In addition, the student of political theory will find Mr. Laslett's introduction particularly fascinating. Demolishing Sidney's characterization of Filmer as a "vicious wretch, a court flatterer with all the faults of Bawds, Whores, Buffoons, Players, Slaves and other base people", the editor moves to an analysis of Filmer's patriarchal argument, compares it to those theories of his contemporaries, shows that Filmer's chief contribution as a thinker was to "combine the subtleties of the doctrine of sovereignty with the crude assumptions of conventional patriarchalism", discusses *Patriarcha's* propaganda value in 1680 when Charles II desperately needed an argument vindicating legitimacy, and summarizes the major points of disagreement on the part of Gee, Sidney, Tyrell, and Locke. The editor's contribution here alone is worth the price of this scholarly gift to the field of political theory.

Oklahoma A. and M. College

Robert E. Powers

WILFRED D. BINKLEY and MALCOLM C. MOOS: *A Grammar of American Politics: The National Government*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949, Pp., 788, \$4.50.)

The chief reason offered for this new book in American National Government and Politics is "that it is time to square off and take another look at our governmental system and in that way attempt to free ourselves from some of the generalizations, abstractions, and conventional fictions that so often obscure a clear view of the realities of American Government." The authors also state that it has been their purpose to discover the human interests, motives, and desires that account for the civic conduct of private citizens and public officials.

The major divisions of the volume are as follows: Foundations of American Government; Citizenship; Institutions of Popular Control; The Presidency; The Federal Administration; The National Legislature; The Federal Judiciary; and Major Federal Functions.

The book has considerable merit. The style is excellent and students should find it quite readable. Organizational problems have been well handled. Essential factual material has been integrated into the text and not relegated to lengthy footnotes. On the other hand, it does seem to this reviewer that factual material is oftentimes too briefly presented. It is, however, a good book and should merit consideration for class use in American National Government.

The University of Texas

Wilfred D. Webb

KINGSLEY DAVIS: *Human Society*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949, Pp., 655, \$4.25.)

In *Human Society*, a textbook for the "principles" course in sociology, Dr. Davis states that he is concerned primarily with "social systems as wholes"; thus, his aim is distinctly sociological. He goes on to explain, however, that he considers sociology a special rather than a general discipline and "devoted to the way in which societies achieve their unity and continuity and the way in which they change."

The approach to the study of this special discipline is made through the detailed study of five broad problems: the problem of social structure, the problem of social functions, the problem of social interaction, the problem of the individual and his society, and the problem of social change. Throughout the book meaning is given to the foregoing problems through insights obtained from sociology, social anthropology and social psychology, including comparative data from many societies.

The textbook is distinguished by its rigid objective and scientific viewpoints, its clarity, its good organization and its depth of interpretation. Recommended for upperclassmen.

Colorado State College of Education

Leslie D. Zeleny

Other Books Received

Achinstein, Ashen: *Introduction to Business Cycle*. (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1950, Pp., 496, \$4.00.)

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: *Government Finance In a Stable and Growing Economy*. (Philadelphia, Pa., 1949, Pp., 256, \$2.00.)

Bates and Field: *State Government* (3rd Ed.). (New York, Harper & Bros., 1949, Pp., 692, \$4.50.)

Blodgett, Dorothy and Terrell: *Address Unknown*. (Austin, Texas, Institute of Public Affairs, 1950, Pp., 12.)

Browne, Vincent J.: *The Control Of The Public Budget*. (Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1949.)

Bureau of Government: *State Aid and Local Finance In Selected Michigan Counties*. (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1949.)

Bureau of Population and Economic Research: *Virginia And The Civil Rights Program; A Symposium of Papers*. (University of Virginia, 1949.)

Bureau of Public Administration: *Technical Assistance To Alabama Governments*. (University of Alabama, 1949.)

Coulter, E. M.: *The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865*. (Vol. 7, History of the South). (Baton Rouge, La., Louisiana State University Press, 1950, Pp., 644, \$7.00.)

Daugert, S. M.: *The Philosophy of Thorstein Veblen*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, Pp., 134, \$2.50.)

Estey, J. A.: *Business Cycles* (2nd Ed.). (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1950, Pp., 527, \$4.50.)

The Fathers of the Church (Vol. 7): *Niceta of Remesiana, Sulpicius Severus, Vincent of Lerins, Prosper of Aquitaine*, Translated by Various Persons. (New York, Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1949, Pp., 443.)

Graves, W. Brooke: *Public Administration In A Democratic Society*. (Boston, D. C. Heath Co., 1950, Pp., 775, \$6.00.)

Hill, Norman: *International Relations—Documents and Readings*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1950, Pp., 536, \$4.50.)

Jenks, W. A.: *The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, Pp., 227, \$3.25.)

Johnson, C. O.: *State and Local Government*. (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1950, Pp., 289, \$2.50.)

Kallen, H. M.: *Patterns of Progress*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, Pp., 87, \$1.75.)

Lancaster, Lane and Breckenridge, A. C. (Ed.): *Readings In American State Government*. (New York, Rinehart & Co., 1950, Pp., 347, \$1.50.)

LeBoutillier, C. G.: *American Democracy and Natural Law*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, Pp., 204, \$3.00.)

Legislative Research Commission: Commonwealth of Kentucky.
—*Judicial Councils*. (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1949.)
—*Kentucky's Handicapped Children*. (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1949.)
—*Kentucky's Rank In Education*. (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1950.)
—*Merit System Legislation For Kentucky*. (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1949.)
—*School Census and Attendance*. (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1950.)
—*Strip Mining In Kentucky*. (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1949.)
—*Supervision of School Finance*. (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1949.)
—*Certification of Teachers*. (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1950.)

Lewis, E. L.: *The Individual and Society*. (New York, Exposition Press, 1949, Pp., 111, \$3.00.)

Macdonald, Austin F.: *American State Government and Administration* (4th Ed.). (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1950, Pp., 722, \$4.00.)

Maki, Lillian: *The Constitution of Justice*. (New York, Exposition Press, 1949, Pp., 150, \$3.00.)

Nelson, B. N.: *The Idea of Usury*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950, Pp., 258, \$3.00.)

Reckless, W. C.: *The Crime Problem*. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, Pp., 537, \$4.25.)

Schowbar, Albert: *Bitter Wind*. (New York, Exposition Press, 1950, Pp., 136, \$2.50.)

Straus, H. A.: *The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949, Pp., 164, \$2.75.)

Teggart, F. J. and Hildebrand, G. H. (Ed.): *The Idea of Progress* (Rev.) (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1949, Pp., 453, \$6.00.)

University of the State of New York: *Child Development Guides* (Rev.)
(Albany, New York, 1949, Pp., 194.)

University of the State of New York: *A Teaching Outline For The Study of New York State History and Constitution*. (Albany, New York, 1949.)

Wendell, Mitchell: *Relations Between the Federal and State Courts*.
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1949, Pp., 298, \$4.00.)

News Notes

Professor L. P. Gabbard, Head of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology of the A. and M. College of Texas, was elected Chairman of the Southwestern Land Tenure Research Committee in its meeting at Biloxi, Mississippi, in February. This committee, active since 1940, consists of representatives of departments of agricultural economics and rural sociology from five institutions in Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, together with a member each from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and the Farm Foundation (the sponsoring agency).

Professor Joe R. Motheral, of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology, A. and M. College of Texas, delivered a report on "Adjusting Rental Agreements to Meet Increases in Farm Mechanization and Livestock Production" at the annual meeting of the Association of Southern Agricultural Workers, Biloxi, Mississippi, in February.

The School of Agriculture, the Experiment Station, and the Extension Service of the A. and M. College of Texas, are cooperating in the preparation of a report entitled "Adjusting Agriculture to Meet Present-Day Conditions". It will be the first of a series of analyses of the adjustment problems confronting Texas farmers under current government control programs. Staff members of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology who are heading committees responsible for various segments of the work are Tyrus R. Timm, Joe R. Motheral, and C. A. Bonnen; other department members assisting are Ralph Rogers, J. R. Campbell, J. Wheeler Barger, Harley Bebout, John H. Southern, John G. McNeely, A. C. Magee, and C. H. Bates.

Dr. Melvin S. Brooks, of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology, A. and M. College of Texas, is on two months leave with the Bureau of the Census, serving in a supervisory capacity in the instruction of enumerators.

Professor Robert J. Harris, of the Department of Government, Louisiana State University, is on sabbatical leave this semester, doing research in public law. Professor Alden L. Powell is serving as acting head of the department during his absence. Professor J. Kimbrough Owen, of the same department, has been appointed Director of Student Life, effective in February 1950. A portion of his teaching duties has been assumed by Dr. Emmett Asaef. Professor Eric Voegelin, also of the Department of Government, is planning to do research in Europe during the summer of 1950.

Dr. A. R. Mangus, Professor of Rural Sociology at Ohio State University, will serve as visiting professor of sociology at New Mexico Highlands University, Las Vegas, this summer. Dr. James E. McKeown, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Highlands, will be on leave to study workers' living conditions in Britain and Scandinavia.

Dr. Walter H. Delaplane, Head of the Department of Economics at the A. and M. College of Texas, delivered a series of seven lectures on the general topic "The International Economy and the National Economy" at the National University of Mexico, February 13-25, upon invitation of the University and of the United States Department of State.

Marshall E. Miller and Edward E. Kern, Research Associates in the Department of Agricultural Economics, Louisiana State University, have resigned to accept other positions; Mr. Miller has been appointed Agricultural Economist in the Sugar Branch of the Production and Marketing Administration, Washington, and Mr. Kern has accepted a position as Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics at Mississippi State College. Henry J. Casso and Olin B. Quinn, formerly graduate assistants in the same department, have been promoted to the rank of Research Associate.

Keith Davis, Associate Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of Texas, is offering a course in Advanced Personnel Administration at Rockland Field, San Antonio.

The Department of Geography of the A. and M. College of Texas announces the addition to its staff of Donald I. Eidemiller in the rank of assistant professor.

A. C. Michaelis, associate professor of management of Tulane University, has been granted a leave of absence on account of illness. James O. Hopkins has been appointed assistant professor of management.

An Institute on Foreign Transportation and Port Operations will be held at Tulane University on April 24-29. The Institute will be under the direction of Dr. Marvin L. Fair, Professor of Economics and Transportation, and will be sponsored by the College of Commerce and Business Administration at Tulane with the cooperation of approximately 15 maritime associations in the New Orleans and the Gulf Coast area. Topics for study and discussion at the Institute include: Problems of Inland Transportation in Foreign Trade. Transportation at the Port, Steamship Traffic and Operations, and Foreign Trade Solicitation and Development. The Institute is designed for junior executives engaged in foreign transportation and port operations.

The Association

The 1950 convention of the Southwestern Social Science Association will be held Friday and Saturday, April 7 and 8, at the Rice Hotel, Houston, Texas. Copies of the preliminary program have been distributed to the members by mail by General Program Chairman Walter T. Watson, of Southern Methodist University. Section meetings begin at 9 a. m. on Friday, April 7. Members are requested to register immediately upon arrival; the Secretary-Treasurer's desk will be located on the Mezzanine floor of the Rice. Members who have not already remitted dues by mail are urged to pay them at the time of registration, by check if possible.

Each section is requested to select its new program chairman and its new associate editor at the Friday afternoon session. Names of the new officers should be reported to the Secretary-Treasurer, George T. Walker.

The Executive Council will meet Thursday, April 6, at 8 p. m., in President Edwin J. Foscue's suite at the Rice.

The Houston Chamber of Commerce has arranged a boat tour of the Port of Houston, from the Turning Basin to the San Jacinto Monument, at 2 p. m., Saturday, April 8. Reservations may be made at the registration desk Friday morning, or in advance by writing Dr. Joseph W. Werlin, University of Houston. In event the demand for tickets exceeds the boat's capacity of 60, the party will be split into two sections, each making half the trip by bus, and a bus fee of about \$1.25 will be necessary. The maximum number of members who can be accommodated in this way is 120.

The Conference Banquet is being revived this year, after a long period of lapse. It is scheduled at 6.30 p. m., Friday, April 7, in the South American Room of the Rice, and will be followed immediately by the presidential address of Dr. Edwin J. Foscue, "Industrialization of the Texas Gulf Coast". Seating will be available for members unable to attend the banquet.

Special luncheon meetings are planned for 12:30 p. m., Friday, April 7, for the Bureaus of Business Research, Psychology, and Social Science Orientation Courses. Reservations may be made at the registration desk.

The general business meeting of the Association will be held at 8 a. m., Saturday, April 8, in the South American Room of the Rice. Business meetings of the Southwestern Sociological Society, which constitutes the Sociology section of the Association, will be held at 8 a. m. Friday and 11:30 a.m., Saturday, both in the Jade Room of the Rice. The Student Section of the Southwestern Sociological Society will meet in connection with the Association's convention; besides its program of papers and

panel discussions, it will hold a student mixer at 8 p. m., Friday, and its business meeting at 9:45 a. m., Saturday.

Committees. President Edwin J. Foscue has announced the appointment of the following committees of the Southwestern Social Science Association for 1949-1950:

NOMINATION OF OFFICERS: James B. Trant, *Chairman*, Louisiana State University; Francis B. Cella, University of Oklahoma; L. F. Connell, Texas College of Arts and Industries; A. W. Foscue, Jr., Southern Methodist University; S. B. McAlister, North Texas State College; John W. Morris, University of Oklahoma; Austin L. Porterfield, Texas Christian University.

MEMBERSHIP (each member is chairman for his state); William L. Bradshaw, University of Missouri; Harvey H. Guice, Southern Methodist University; Adlowe L. Larson, Oklahoma A and M College; S. W. Preston, Louisiana State University; Harold G. Scroggins, University of Arkansas; Richard Strahlem, University of New Mexico; Hugo Wall, University of Wichita.

ARRANGEMENTS: Joseph S. Werlin, *Chairman*, University of Houston; Everett D. Dyer, University of Houston; John E. Hodges, Rice Institute; Bradford B. Hudson, Rice Institute; D. W. Knepper, University of Houston.

INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERSHIPS: C. J. Bollinger, *Chairman*, University of Oklahoma; Louis G. Kahle, University of Missouri; L. S. Paine, A and M College of Texas; Rupert N. Richardson, Hardin-Simmons University; John W. White, University of Arkansas.

ENDOWMENT: Cortez A. M. Ewing, *Chairman*, University of Oklahoma; Wm. T. Chambers, Stephen F. Austin State College; J. A. Fitzgerald, University of Texas; B. F. Harrison, Oklahoma A and M College; Elmer Scott, Civic Federation of Dallas.

RESOLUTIONS: H. Malcolm MacDonald, *Chairman*, University of Texas; W. J. Hammond, Texas Christian University; Carol Y. Mason, University of Tulsa; G. W. McGinty, Northwestern State College; Jim E. Reese, University of Oklahoma; A. Stephen Stephan, University of Arkansas.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: John S. Kyser, *Chairman*, Northwestern State College; Ethan Allan, University of Kansas; C. E. Ayres, University of Texas; J. L. Charlton, University of Arkansas; Jack Johnson, North Texas State College; V. G. Sorrell, University of New Mexico.

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